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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Rethinking Surrogacy Laws / Te Kohuki Ture Kopu Whangai 
In a surrogacy arrangement, a woman (the surrogate) carries out a pregnancy and gives birth to a child 
for another person or persons (the intended or commissioning parent(s)) to raise. Surrogacy 
arrangements are complex and raise many legal, ethical and cultural issues. They include issues 
surrounding child welfare, reproductive freedom, exploitation of the surrogate, commodification of 
the child, immigration, citizenship and custody. Amongst these issues is the potential impact of the 
surrogacy arrangement on the rights of the parties involved – the surrogate mother, the intended 
parent(s) and the resulting child or children.   
Surrogacy, particularly international surrogacy, where the intended parent(s) and the surrogate live in 
different countries, is an increasingly prevalent form of artificial reproduction.  For example, statistics 
from the Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ECART), which authorises 
applications for assisted reproductive procedures within New Zealand, suggest an increase in 
surrogacy-related applications.1 ECART began hearing applications in 2005, and in that year heard 12 
applications for surrogacy. From 2006–2009 it heard 18–19 applications per year, approving 16–17 
per year. By 2014-2015, this had increased to 22 and 25 applications respectively with 20 applications 
approved in each year. In each of 2017 and 2018, there were 29 applications, with 6 approved in 2017, 
and 19 approved in 2018. Overall, ECART has heard 291 applications to the end of 2018. Of these, 187 
were approved outright, 51 were approved with some conditions, 10 were declined, and 16 were 
deferred (with most being approved in subsequent meetings). Statistics on international cross-border 
surrogacy are more difficult to find. As international surrogacies tend to involve payment to the 
surrogate and intermediaries and are prohibited in many countries, intended parents may attempt to 
‘hide’ the arrangement. 
The popularity of surrogacy, and the potentially devastating impact on the parties to the arrangement 
should something not go according to plan, particularly with international surrogacy arrangements, 
suggest a pressing need for legal attention. Since 2015, researchers at the University of Canterbury 
have been examining the legal, ethical, cultural and societal implications of surrogacy arrangements 
in New Zealand. Led by principal investigators Debra Wilson, Rhonda Powell and Annick Masselot, the 
Rethinking Surrogacy Laws/Te Kohuki Ture Kopu Whangai project involves critical and comparative 
legal analysis as well as qualitative interviews with industry stakeholders, policy makers and interest 
groups.  
Rethinking Surrogacy Laws/Te Kohuki Ture Kopu Whangai aims to answer the following questions: 
 What are the views on surrogacy held by people or groups in New Zealand and are there 
identifiable reasons underpinning these views? 
 What policy objectives should a model law or best practice guide incorporate? 
 Does the current law reflect these policy goals? 
 What are the various options for law reform which might better reflect these policy goals? 
 What would a model surrogacy law look like?  
                                                          
1 Child Law (online ed, Westlaw) at [5.4]. 
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Rethinking Surrogacy Laws/Te Kohuki Ture Kopu Whangai has been generously funded by the New 
Zealand Law Foundation, and supported by the University of Canterbury School of Law Research 
Committee. 
Surrogacy and Human Rights 
As a contribution to the Rethinking Surrogacy Laws project, this Report sets out the core human rights 
relevant to three of the key actors in any surrogacy arrangement – the surrogate, the child and the 
intended parent(s). It focuses specifically on human rights recognised in law, as opposed to those 
recognised in moral philosophy. It explains the international legal basis of each right and then analyses 
in turn what each right requires, the application of each right in the surrogacy context, and the 
application of each right in the surrogacy context in New Zealand. Each section concludes with 
questions to be addressed in any future review of the regulatory and policy framework for surrogacy 
in New Zealand. We intend that this Report be used as a resource document by those concerned with 
and interested in surrogacy law reform in New Zealand.   
The Core Human Rights at Stake 
There is no particular international human rights treaty that directly or comprehensively addresses 
the human rights of surrogate mothers. There are however several rights of particular relevance to 
surrogate mothers: the right to health, the right to privacy and employment rights. New Zealand does 
reasonably well in protecting the right to health of surrogate mothers based in New Zealand. It can be 
argued that the right to privacy of surrogate mothers in New Zealand is currently limited as a result of 
the prohibition on commercial surrogacy arrangements in New Zealand, and the inability to enforce a 
surrogacy contract. In the current absence of a clear Government statement as to the rationale for 
these limits, it is difficult to assess whether these limits on a surrogate’s right to privacy can be 
justified. Aside from the right to health and the right to privacy, a surrogate mother may have various 
employment rights including the right to work and the right to just and favourable conditions of 
employment. Whether or not it is appropriate to view surrogacy, even paid surrogacy, through the 
lens of employment, a surrogate may be engaged in other employment and so would have recognised 
rights in relation to that employment. 
In relation to the child born of a surrogacy arrangement, the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), ratified by New Zealand, sets out the key rights. Foremost amongst these is the 
overarching obligation to consider the best interests of the child. There is room for New Zealand to 
improve its recognition and application of the best interests principle in the surrogacy context both in 
terms of statutory provisions and practical guidance. Other important rights for children born of a 
surrogacy arrangement are the right to nationality and the right to identity. These rights are currently 
reasonably well protected for surrogacy arrangements in New Zealand. Concerns with realisation of 
these rights mostly arise in relation to international surrogacy arrangements entered into by New 
Zealand based intending parent(s). Given the cross-border nature of international surrogacy 
arrangements, it is difficult to comprehensively regulate for them in New Zealand. In relation to 
commercial surrogacy arrangements, a key threshold issue is whether the right of a child not to be 
sold is breached by such an arrangement. Given its threshold nature, the issue of sale of children 
requires resolution at the international level, and in particular a definitive view on whether and in 
what circumstances commercial surrogacy arrangements will breach the prohibition on sale of 
children.  
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The human rights most relevant to the intended parent(s) in a surrogacy arrangement include the 
right to reproduce and the right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement. There is no 
internationally recognised right to reproduce, but it is usually linked to one or more of the rights to 
marry and found a family, the right to health and the right to respect for private and family life. In New 
Zealand, one of the main issues arising in the context of the right to reproduce is the need to ensure 
that access to fertility services (including surrogacy) is provided on a non-discriminatory basis. The 
right to science has some relevance to the rights of intended parent(s) in the surrogacy context, but is 
currently under-developed both internationally and in New Zealand. 
Dealing with Conflicts between Rights in the Surrogacy Context 
Rights express different individual interests and demands upon states. Humans’ social existence 
however may mean that two or more rights cannot be realised simultaneously, causing a rights 
conflict. Human rights law has developed two approaches for addressing rights conflicts: definitional 
balancing and ad hoc balancing.2  Definitional balancing requires the decision maker to define the 
rights as narrowly as possible.3  With each right being given only a narrow meaning, any rights conflict 
is removed and individuals can exercise rights harmoniously.4  An alternative approach is ad hoc 
balancing. Adopted in European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, this approach requires 
decision makers to consider the necessity of any limitation on a right in achieving a necessary social 
goal and the proportionality of the limitation in relation to its legitimate aim.5 Through considering 
the necessity and proportionality of any limitation on a right, the decision maker can determine what 
compromises appropriately allow the realisation of multiple conflicting rights. New Zealand courts 
have adopted both definitional and ad hoc balancing approaches in resolving rights conflicts, leaving 
the law in this area “confused”.6 
Within the surrogacy context the tripartite nature of a typical surrogacy arrangement may lead to 
different rights conflicts. One example of a potential conflict of rights may arise where a surrogate 
develops health complications during her pregnancy and wishes not to carry the child to full-term, 
causing a potential conflict between the surrogate’s rights to health and liberty and security of the 
person and the intending parent(s)’ right to reproduce. Another example of a potential conflict of 
rights in the surrogacy context is where a state determines that the best interests of the child requires 
an assessment of the parenting ability of intending parent(s). Assessing the intending parent(s)’ 
parenting ability may interfere with their right to privacy and family life, but failure to assess parenting 
ability may be contrary to the child’s best interests.  
Analysis of jurisprudence addressing rights conflicts between parents and children may help 
understand how decision makers would determine a rights conflict in the surrogacy context. In the 
New Zealand decision of Re J (An Infant): B and B v Director-General of Social Welfare,  the Court of 
Appeal considered a conflict between parents’ rights to freedom of belief under s 15 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and a child’s right to life under s 8 of that Act.7 In resolving 
                                                          
2 Dr A S Butler and Dr P Butler Laws of New Zealand Human Rights (online ed) at [53]. 
3 Re J (An Infant): B and B v Director-General of Social Welfare [1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA) at 146.  
4 At 146. 
5 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 (ECHR) at [70]. 
6 Butler and Butler, above n 2, at [53]. 
7 Re J (An Infant), above n 3, at 146.  
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the conflict the Court adopted a definitional approach, finding that the parents’ right to manifest their 
religious beliefs could not extend to endangering B’s life.8  
Outside of judicial decisions, several sources have advocated for the application of an ad hoc balancing 
approach in resolving rights conflicts in this area. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, the United 
Nations treaty body that monitors compliance with the CRC, has noted that conflicts between other 
rights and the best interests of the child should be resolved on a case-by-case basis.9 In the context of 
the necessity of parenting assessments to protect a child’s best interests, John Tobin has suggested 
that any interference or limitation on the parent(s)’ right to privacy and family life would need to be 
justified as a proportionate measure to achieve a legitimate aim.10  Whether a parenting suitability 
assessment is a proportionate measure would depend on the nature and extent of the assessment in 
any given case although Tobin notes that “although this issue may be contentious, it would arguably 
fall within a State’s margin of appreciation to insist upon such an assessment”.11   
New Zealand Courts’ lack of acceptance of a single approach to resolving rights conflicts and the 
differing approaches taken overseas means that it is currently unclear how rights conflicts would be 
addressed in the surrogacy context. Although globally there seems to be a trend towards ad hoc 
balancing, it is possible that jurisdictions may develop different approaches to determining rights 
conflicts in the surrogacy area, causing significant complexity and uncertainty for transnational 
surrogacy arrangements.  
Future Law Reform 
We believe that reform of New Zealand’s law relating to surrogacy is needed urgently. In addition, we 
believe that any future law reform exercise will need to ensure consistency with New Zealand’s 
international human rights obligations. It is suggested that the human rights obligations covered in 
this Report be used as a yardstick to underpin any future reform. Part Five of this Report collates the 
key human rights questions requiring consideration in any future reform. 
  
                                                          
8 Re J (An Infant), above n 3, at 146. The Court relied on the Canadian Supreme Court decision in B(R) v Children’s 
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1995) 1 SCR 315. 
9 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 14: on the right of the child to have his or her best 
interests taken as a primary consideration UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14 (29 May 2013) at [39]. 
10 John Tobin “To Prohibit or Permit: What is the (Human) Rights Response to the Practice of International 
Commercial Surrogacy?” 2014 63(2) ICLQ 317 at 333. 
11 At 333. 
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PART TWO: RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE 
Introduction 
There is no particular international human rights treaty that directly addresses the human rights of 
surrogates. Nevertheless, there are several relevant rights recognised in international human rights 
law, primarily: 
 the right to health; 
 the right to privacy;  
 the right to work and the right to just and favourable working conditions; and  
 the right to freedom from discrimination.  
The Surrogate’s Right to Health 
The international legal basis of the right 
The right to health was first articulated in 1946 in the Constitution of the World Health Organization, 
which defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity”.12 
The right to health is recognised in art 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as an 
aspect of the right to an adequate standard of living. The same article recognises that motherhood is 
entitled to “special care and assistance”.13  
The clearest and most direct iteration of the right to health is art 12(1) of the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which reads: “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”14 New Zealand ratified the ICESCR in 1978 and is therefore bound by its 
terms at international law. New Zealand has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR which 
provides for an individual complaint mechanism.15  
The right to health is also included in art 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).16 In addition to requiring states to “take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care”, art 12(2) requires 
states to ensure that women have appropriate services in connection with pregnancy and birth. New 
Zealand ratified CEDAW in 1985, and the Optional Protocol to CEDAW which provides for an individual 
complaint mechanism in 2000.17 
                                                          
12 Constitution of the World Health Organization 14 UNTS 185 (opened for signature 22 July 1946, entered into 
force 7 April 1948). 
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217 A (1948) [UDHR], art 25(2). 
14 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR].  
15 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 63/117, 
A/63/435 (opened for signature 24 September 2009, entered into force 5 May 2013).  
16 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1249 UNTS 1 (opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) [CEDAW].  
17 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women  2131 
UNTS 83 (opened for signature 10 December 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) [OP-CEDAW]. 
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The right not to be discriminated against on the ground of health has been proclaimed by the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),18 and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).19  
What does the right to health require? 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the United Nations treaty body that 
monitors the ICESCR, interprets the right to health to include the underlying determinants of health, 
such as access to fresh water, housing, food and sanitation; a healthy occupational environment; 
education on sexual and reproductive health; and participation in health policy decision-making.20 
According to the CESCR, healthcare facilities must be: 
 available; 
 accessible (economically, physically, without discrimination, and with information 
accessibility); 
 acceptable (taking into account gender and cultural dynamics); and 
 of good quality. 
The right to health includes a number of freedoms, and in particular the freedom to control one’s 
health and body, sexual and reproductive freedom, the freedom from forced medical treatment and 
freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.21 
The right to health includes entitlements, such as a system of health protection and equal 
opportunities to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health.22   
The ICESCR provides for progressive realisation of the rights protected, including the right to health, 
and acknowledges the constraints placed on states by limits in availability of resources.23 
Nevertheless, states are immediately obliged to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards 
realisation of the rights and to guarantee that the rights are exercised without discrimination.24 
The right to health in the surrogacy context 
The surrogate’s right to health extends to her physical, psychological and sociological well-being. The 
preconditions to her health should be guaranteed, such as adequate shelter, clean and potable 
water, sanitation and nutrition.  
A critical issue in the surrogacy context is the ability for the surrogate to exercise control over her 
pregnancy. Research suggests that it is common in some international surrogacy clinics for clinical 
                                                          
18 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660 UNTS 1 (opened for 
signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) [CERD], art 5(e)(f). 
19 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2515 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 30 March 2007, 
entered into force 3 May 2008) [CRPD], art 25. 
20 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 14: The right to the 
highest attainable standards of health UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) at [4]. 
21 At [8]. 
22 At [8]. 
23 ICESCR, art 2. 
24 ICESCR, art 2.  
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decisions to be made about the surrogate’s pregnancy, and for medical procedures to be performed, 
without her informed consent.25  
Accessibility of information is important in the surrogacy context. This refers to information being 
provided to the surrogate about what the in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) process entails, and her pregnancy 
more generally, to enable her to make decisions about her medical care. Research suggests that, in 
some international surrogacy clinics, surrogates may be denied full information about the medical 
procedures they will be subjected to.26 
The right to health requires that a surrogate should receive antenatal, intrapartum and postnatal 
healthcare of an adequate standard. The right is to progressive realisation of the right to health, 
subject to available resources.  
Pregnancy entails a number of natural risks, some of which may be exacerbated by medical decisions 
in the surrogacy context. For example, it is common in some countries to implant multiple embryos in 
the surrogate, which may lead to higher-risk multiple pregnancies or the need for a foetal reduction 
procedure.27 This raises questions about discriminatory or unethical treatment of surrogates, who 
may be put at greater medical risk than other birthing women. 
Although there are risks associated with all births, caesarean sections, which are common for 
international surrogacy arrangements,28 lead to increased health risks for the woman. These include 
blood loss, wound infection, deep vein thrombosis, pulmonary embolism, damage to the bladder, and 
risks associated with anaesthetic. These risks are exacerbated in future pregnancies,29 and it is 
possible that women who act as surrogates in places like India and Thailand may not be able to afford 
the specialised medical care required for pregnancy after a caesarean section.30 
Any pregnancy, including surrogate pregnancies, may present mental health risks to the surrogate, 
including post-partum depression. There is therefore a need for psychological and social support for 
surrogates during the pregnancy and after the birth. The practice in some centres of isolating 
surrogates from their communities in order to exert greater control over their pregnancies may be a 
contributing factor to post-partum depression.31 
Social risks may result if surrogates are separated from their families and communities, as is the 
practice in some overseas clinics. In some places this may include separation from young children. On 
                                                          
25  Pip Trowse and Donna Cooper “The Agony and the Ecstasy: Sacrifice and Pain for Financial Gain: Have Indian 
Surrogate Mothers Been Exploited by Their Intended Parents in Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements?” (2018) 
25 JLM 388 at 401-405; Malene Tanderup et al “Reproductive Ethics in Commercial Surrogacy: Decision-Making 
in IVF Clinics in New Delhi, India” (2015) 12 Bioethical Inquiry 491 at 494. 
26 Trowse and Cooper, above n 25, at 403-404; Tanderup et al, above n 25, at 494. 
27 Trowse and Cooper, above n 25, at 403; Tanderup et al, above n 25, at 496-497. 
28 See Amrita Pande Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 2014), Table AP-2 showing data on surrogates delivering at one Indian surrogacy clinic in 2007. Of 40 
women, 38 had had at least one previous natural birth and yet only two had vaginal births of their surrogate 
children (two were yet to deliver).  
29 The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists “Caesarean Section” 
<https://www.ranzcog.edu.au/Womens-Health/Patient-Information-Resources/Caesarean-Section>. 
30 Nicole F Bromfield and Karen Smith Rotab “Global Surrogacy, Exploitation, Human Rights and International 
Private Law: A Pragmatic Stance and Policy Recommendations” (2014) 1 Glob Soc Welf 123 at 127. 
31 At 127. 
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the other hand, some surrogates have stated that their living conditions are higher while living in the 
clinic than they would be otherwise, or that they enjoy the opportunity to rest. 32 
Realising the right to health in New Zealand in the surrogacy context 
Many of the potential concerns around the surrogate’s right to health are relevant in the international 
context but less likely to be in issue in New Zealand.  
The only surrogacy-specific health regulation in New Zealand is the guideline issued by the Advisory 
Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ACART) on surrogacy involving assisted 
reproductive procedures.33 
The ethical approval process required for assisted reproductive treatment in New Zealand applies to 
surrogacies involving IVF or other fertility treatment.34 In considering whether to approve an 
application for an assisted reproductive procedure involving surrogacy, ECART must consider whether 
the surrogate has received counselling.35 There is no financial provision for the psychological or social 
care of surrogates. Nor is there a formal process to see that she obtains appropriate support before 
and after the birth.  
New Zealand offers free antenatal, intrapartum and postnatal care to most women.36 This usually 
involves continuity of care by a lead maternity carer, who is usually a midwife but can be a general 
practitioner or obstetrician. Midwifery care before, during and for 4-6 weeks after the birth, may be 
provided in a clinic, at the woman’s home, or in a public or private hospital. Midwifery care in New 
Zealand is normally holistic and incorporates psychological and social support as well as health 
promotion, screening, risk assessment, and education related to pregnancy and birth.37 Surrogates are 
entitled to the same public health services as other pregnant women.  
Beyond the care provided by her midwife, there is no specific provision for the additional mental 
health care that may be necessary to support a surrogate through her pregnancy and after 
relinquishing the infant. New Zealand has some provision for publicly funded mental health services, 
which are accessible through general practitioners. 
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights (Code of Rights) details both patient 
rights and the corresponding duties of health practitioners.38 Rights relevant to surrogacy include: 
Right 1: The right to be treated with respect; 
Right 2: The right to freedom from discrimination, coercion, harassment and exploitation; 
                                                          
32 See Pande, above n 28, at 74-83. 
33 Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology Guidelines on surrogacy involving Assisted 
Reproductive Procedures (ACART Guidelines) (December 2013). 
34 HART Act, s 27.  
35 ACART Guidelines, above n 33. 
36 Health and Disability Services Eligibility Direction 2011. 
37 The statement of Philosophy of the New Zealand College of Midwives includes: “Midwifery is holistic by 
nature: combining an understanding of the social, emotional, cultural, spiritual, psychological and physical 
ramifications of women’s reproductive health experience, actively promoting and protecting women’s wellness; 
promoting health awareness in women’s significant others.”  See New Zealand College of Midwives “Philosophy 
and Code of Ethics” <https://www.midwife.org.nz/midwives/professional-standards/philosophy-and-code-of-
ethics/>. 
38 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer Rights’) Regulations 
1996 [Code of Rights]. 
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Right 3: The right to dignity and independence; 
Right 4: The right to services of an appropriate standard; 
Right 5: The right to effective communication; 
Right 6: The right to be fully informed; 
Right 7: The right to make an informed choice and give informed consent; and 
Right 8: The right to support. 
The Health and Disability Commissioner considers allegations of breach of the Code of Rights, 
including in the context of maternity care. 
The right to refuse medical treatment is also protected by s 11 NZBORA, although there are limited 
remedies available for breaches. This right includes the ability to make decisions related to IVF 
treatment, abortion, foetal reduction, antenatal screening tests and caesarean section births. 
It is unclear how well the surrogate’s right to make decisions about her pregnancy is protected in 
practice (particularly against the expectations of intended parents) due to insufficient research on 
surrogates in New Zealand. This question would become even more pressing if surrogacy contracts 
were enforceable in New Zealand. At present, s 14 of the Human Assisted Reproductive Treatment 
Act 2004 (HART Act) renders them null and void.  
Anecdotal reports suggest some confusion as to the rights and obligations in relation to the infant 
when surrogates give birth in hospital. This may cause unnecessary stress to the surrogate (and 
intended parents). 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to health 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s right 
to health: 
 How can New Zealand best respect, protect, and fulfil the surrogate’s rights to psychological 
and social support during the pregnancy and after the birth?  
 How can New Zealand promote clinical decision-making in relation to surrogate pregnancies 
that minimises physical and psychological risks to the surrogate? 
 How can New Zealand best respect, protect, and fulfil the surrogate’s right to exercise control 
over her body during the pregnancy and birth? 
 If s 14 of the HART Act were amended or repealed such that surrogacy contracts could be 
enforced, how would the surrogate’s rights to exercise control over her body during the 
pregnancy and birth be protected? 
 What could New Zealand do to facilitate rights-consistent processes and procedures in 
hospitals for surrogate births?  
10 
 
The Surrogate’s Right to Privacy 
The international legal basis of the right 
The right to privacy is based on the liberal value of minimising unjustified state interference with an 
individual’s personal affairs. This right has been recognised by the common law since the 18th 
century,39 and is the foundation of a variety of common law and statutory rights that are part of New 
Zealand law.40 The right to privacy is widely recognised as a core part of international human rights 
law, and is included in art 12 UDHR. 
The most relevant iteration of the right to privacy is art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation”.41 New Zealand ratified the ICCPR in 1978 and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR in 
1989. The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provides a mechanism for individual complaints to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC).42  
A broader formulation of right to privacy, the right to private life, is recognised in several regional 
human rights instruments, although none of these apply to New Zealand.43   
What does the right to privacy require? 
Article 17 has a broad meaning and extends to issues such as state surveillance; bodily searches; 
expression of one’s identity (including name changes, legal identity, and religious identity); protection 
of the family; protection of the home; and interception of correspondence.44 
Complaints about breaches of the right to privacy under the ICCPR often also invoke the rights to non-
discrimination (arts 2 and 26 ICCPR) and family life (art 23 ICCPR). 
The right to privacy is directly relevant to sexual and reproductive matters and has been invoked in 
HRC proceedings under the individual complaint mechanism related to the criminalisation of 
homosexuality45 and denial of access to lawful abortion.46 
The right to privacy is not absolute. The text of art 17 allows for limitations provided they are not 
unlawful or arbitrary.  
                                                          
39 Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807 (Comm Pleas). 
40 Paul Roth “Privacy, Autonomy and Family Life” in Margaret Bedggood, Kris Gledhill and Ian McIntosh (eds) 
International Human Rights Law in Aotearoa New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2017) 421 at 422.  
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR], art 17(1).  
42 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
43 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed 4 November 1950, entered into 
force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR), art 8 and American Convention on Human Rights 1144 UNTS 
123 (opened for signature 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978), art 11.  
44 See generally Roth, above n 40. United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment No 16: Article 17 
(Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour 
and Reputation XXXII (8 April 1988).  
45 See for example Toonen v Australia UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (31 March 1994). 
46 VDA v Argentina UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (29 March 2011) and KL v Peru UN Doc 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (24 October 2005). 
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At international law, any limitation in a human right is to be interpreted strictly and in favour of the 
rights-holder.47  It should also be subject to the possibility of challenge so as to provide a remedy for 
any abuse.48 The state holds the burden of justifying limitation of rights.49 
When a limitation is stated to be necessary, this means that the limitation:50 
(a) is based on one of the grounds justifying limitations recognised by the relevant article of 
the covenant; 
(b) responds to a pressing public or social need; 
(c) pursues a legitimate aim; and  
(d) is proportionate to that aim. 
In the case of the ICCPR, the HRC has stated that, although limitations on the right to privacy are 
permissible if they are in accordance with the law, any law that limits the right must itself be consistent 
with the aims and objectives of the ICCPR:51 
“The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even 
interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular 
circumstances.” 
 
The rights of others (such as children) and the need to protect public morality may each be legitimate 
aims. In order to invoke public morality as a ground to limit human rights, the state “while enjoying a 
certain margin of discretion, shall demonstrate that the limitation in question is essential to the 
maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the community.”52 This logically requires a view to 
be taken about the fundamental values of the community in question.  The greater the disagreement 
amongst the community about a particular issue, the harder it will be to justify limiting a human right 
based on the values of the community. 
The right to privacy in the surrogacy context 
In the context of surrogacy, the surrogate’s right to privacy extends to her right to reproductive 
autonomy, which includes the right to make decisions about: 
 whether to enter into a surrogacy arrangement; and 
 the medical management of her pregnancy and birth.  
Decision making in childbirth has been considered by the ECtHR in relation to art 8 of the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) concerning the 
right to respect for privacy and family life, home and correspondence. In considering whether a state’s 
                                                          
47 American Association for the International Commission of Jurists Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (April 1985) [Siracusa Principles], 
[IA(3)]. 
48 Siracusa Principles, [IA(8)]. 
49 Siracusa Principles, [IA(12)]. 
50 Siracusa Principles, [IA(10)]. See also Toonen v Australia, above n 45 at [8.3]. 
51 United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment No 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) The Right to 
Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, above n 44, at 
[3]-[4].  
52 Siracusa Principles, [IB](27).  
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restrictive homebirth policy breached a woman’s right to privacy and family life, the ECtHR stated 
that:53 
“The notion of personal autonomy is a fundamental principle underlying the interpretation of 
the guarantees of Article 8 … The Court is satisfied that the circumstances of giving birth 
incontestably form part of one's private life for the purposes of this provision; and the 
Government did not contest this issue.” 
As well as the right to personal autonomy54 and the right to choose the circumstances in which one 
gives birth,55 art 8 extends to personal relationships, including professional or business relationships.56 
It covers the relationships in a surrogacy arrangement between intended parents and child in a 
surrogacy arrangement.57 
Article 8 ECHR is not applicable in New Zealand and is broader than art 17 ICCPR but it still provides a 
guide to its likely interpretation on similar issues.  
Government interference with surrogacy relationships must be justified. Interference may include any 
prohibition on the intended parent(s) providing reimbursement, compensation or remuneration to 
the surrogate. Whether a particular interference (for example, restricting surrogacy arrangements, or 
aspects of surrogacy arrangements, such as reimbursement of expenses or remuneration of 
surrogates) can be justified depends upon an assessment of the validity of the reasons that the state 
may have. 
John Tobin argues that:58 
“… the right to respect to privacy and family life encompasses a right to enter surrogacy 
arrangements, this right remains subject to a State’s capacity (and potential obligation) to 
restrict this where it is reasonably necessary to (a) protect the rights of persons other than 
the intending parents and/or (b) protect public morality.” 
There is a need to establish the relevant “public morality” in the state at the relevant time, in order to 
evaluate any limitations on privacy for compliance with human rights law.  
  
ECtHR case law which balances public purposes with privacy rights in the surrogacy context is fact-
specific in balancing the public interest in enforcing the law with the right to privacy of either the 
intended parent(s) or the surrogate-born children.59 There is no ECtHR jurisprudence about the right 
to privacy of the surrogate.  
                                                          
53 Ternovszky v Hungary ECHR 67545/09, 14 December 2010 at [22]. 
54 Pretty v United Kingdom, above n 5.  
55 Ternovszky v Hungary, above n 53. 
56 Niemitz v Germany ECHR 13710/88, 16 December 1992 at [29].  
57 Mennesson v France ECHR 65192/11, 26 June 2014. 
58 Tobin, above n 10, at 325. 
59 Compare Mennesson v France above n 57 and Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy Grand Chamber ECHR 25358/12, 
24 January 2017.  
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Realising the right to privacy for surrogates in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, art 17 ICCPR is implemented in a piecemeal approach in a range of statutory and 
common law contexts.60 The right to privacy is not recognised in NZBORA. New Zealand’s obligations 
under international human rights law still play a role in developing the common law,61 interpreting 
legislation,62 and as a relevant consideration for decision-makers.63  
The ICCPR obliges New Zealand to justify any limitations on the surrogate’s decisions to enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement.  
New Zealand does not currently limit the ability of a surrogate to act as a surrogate. However, it does 
interfere with the surrogate’s right to privacy by: 
 preventing the surrogate from receiving compensation or consideration; and 
 making surrogacy contracts unenforceable. 
The giving or receiving of valuable consideration for entering into a surrogacy arrangement is 
criminalised by s 14(3) of the HART Act, which reads: 
“Every person commits an offence who gives or receives, or agrees to give or receive, valuable 
consideration for his or her participation, or for any other person’s participation, or for 
arranging any other person’s participation, in a surrogacy arrangement.” 
The payment to a fertility clinic or legal advisor of reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in 
relation to the surrogacy is permitted.64 
Surrogacy contracts are also unenforceable.65 Arguably, the unenforceability of surrogacy contracts 
makes the surrogate, the intended parents and the child more vulnerable due to the lack of certainty 
in their positions.  
To comply with international law, these limitations on the surrogate’s rights must be justifiable.  To 
date, no official justification has been provided.  
The most likely justifications that the state could offer are arguments that: 
 commercial surrogacy amounts to sale of children in breach of CRC (see Part Three);  
 it is contrary to public morality to require a woman to relinquish a child after its birth and 
therefore surrogacy contracts should not be enforceable;  
 commercial surrogacy amounts to exploitation of women and is therefore contrary to public 
morality; or 
 all surrogacy amounts to commodification of women and is therefore contrary to public 
morality.  
                                                          
60 See the discussion in Roth, above n 40, at 440-449. 
61 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34. 
62 Zaoui v AG (No 2) [2006] 1 NZLR 289 (SC). 
63 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA). 
64 HART Act, s 14(4).  
65 HART Act, s 14(1).  
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Each of these potential justifications contains disputable premises, about which there is disagreement 
in bioethical and legal academic literature.66  
Several of these potential justifications rely on a concept of “public morality” (or similar) which needs 
greater specificity and objectivity in order to justify the limitation of a human right. In turn this 
depends upon an assessment of the fundamental values of the community.  
A recent survey on perceptions of the New Zealand public showed that most New Zealanders think 
that domestic surrogacy should be legal, and among them, the majority thought that surrogates 
should be paid for their time and service.67 Further, most respondents thought that surrogacy 
contracts should be enforceable.68 It may therefore be that the current legislative approach in New 
Zealand is not supported by the fundamental values of the community.  
To date, there has been no clear policy argument on this issue made by the New Zealand government 
that would satisfy the requirements of the ICCPR. The limitation on a surrogate’s right to enter an 
enforceable or paid surrogacy agreement has not yet been tested in any international court. 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to privacy 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s right 
to privacy: 
 What justifications can the New Zealand government offer for the limitation on the 
surrogate’s right to enter into an enforceable surrogacy contract? 
 What justifications can the New Zealand government offer for the limitation on the 
surrogate’s right to enter into a paid surrogacy arrangement? 
 Do these justifications meet the criteria for legitimate limitation on international human 
rights? 
 Do these justifications constitute unjustified discrimination against surrogates? 
 What are the fundamental values of the New Zealand community in relation to surrogacy? 
  
                                                          
66 See literature discussed in Natalie Baird “Commercial Surrogacy and the Sale of Children: A Call to Action for 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child” in Annick Masselot and Rhonda Powell (eds) Perspectives on 
Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy and Rights (Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law 
Inc, Christchurch, 2019) 115 and Rhonda Powell “Exploitation of Surrogate Mothers in New Zealand” in Annick 
Masselot and Rhonda Powell (eds) Perspectives on Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy 
and Rights (Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law Inc, Christchurch, 2019) 57.  
67 D Wilson Part Two: Understanding the Perceptions and Experiences of Surrogates through Empirical Research 
(Report to the New Zealand Law Foundation, 2019) at 8. 
68 D Wilson “The Emerging Picture of the Role Played by Surrogacy Contracts in New Zealand” in Annick Masselot 
and Rhonda Powell (eds) Perspectives on Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy and Rights 
(Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law Inc, Christchurch, 2019) 153 at 172 and following. 
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The Surrogate’s Employment Rights 
Employment rights have been developed in parallel by the international human rights movement and 
the international labour movement.69 There is considerable overlap between rights protected by 
ICESCR and the various Conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO).   
The two employment rights most relevant to surrogacy are the right to work and the right to just and 
favourable conditions of employment. The right to work is important in realising other human rights 
and in allowing people to live in dignity. It also contributes to the survival of the individual and their 
family, and supports the individual’s recognition within the community.70 
It is not clear whether surrogacy should be treated as a form of ‘employment’ so as to engage 
employment rights. The conventional view is that employment rights only apply to paid work. 
However, it has been argued that the right to work extends to voluntary work,71 in which case it could 
apply to surrogacy, whether or not it is paid.  Even if this is the case, surrogacy is more akin to a 
contractor role than an employee role, and so many employment-related rights will not apply.  
Whether or not acting as a surrogate engages the right to work, a surrogate may be engaged in other 
employment and would have recognised rights in relation to that employment.  
The right to work 
The international legal basis of the right 
The right to work is recognised by art 23 UDHR and art 6(1) ICESCR, the latter of which provides:  
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the 
right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.” 
What does the right require? 
It has been stated that the right to work in art 6(1) ICESCR “…essentially means that everyone, without 
discrimination, should be able to earn their living at work that they freely choose…”.72 The right to 
work covers all forms of employment, and arguably applies to voluntary work too.73  
The international jurisprudence about the right to work has focussed on the right to be free from 
forced or coerced labour, and the right not to lose one’s employment unfairly or arbitrarily. The right 
to be free from coerced or forced labour may be relevant to surrogacy in some international contexts 
but there is no evidence that women in New Zealand are forced to be surrogates. The right not to lose 
one’s employment unfairly or arbitrarily may be relevant to employed women who act as surrogates 
in New Zealand.  
                                                          
69 Paul Roth “Economic Rights: Workplace Rights and the Right to Social Security” in Margaret Bedggood, Kris 
Gledhill and Ian McIntosh (eds) International Human Rights Law in Aotearoa New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2017) 611 at 611.  
70 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 18: The right to work 
UN Doc E/C.12/GC.18 (6 February 2006) at [1]. 
71 B Saul, D Kinley and J Mowbray The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Commentary, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 281-282.  
72 Roth, above n 69 at 623. 
73 Saul et al, above n 71.  
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Based on the text of art 6(1), it could be argued that a woman has the right to choose to gain a living 
by being a surrogate. A parallel could be made with sex-work, which is regulated in New Zealand within 
an occupational health context.74 Of course, few rights are absolute, and recognition of a right to gain 
a living by being a surrogate would not prevent regulations aimed at protecting the interests of the 
surrogate, the intended parents and the child. 
Most jurisprudence on the right to work focuses on the prohibition on forced or compulsory labour 
and the arbitrary or unfair deprivation of employment.75 The second of these has most relevance to 
surrogacy.  
The ILO Termination of Employment Convention (ILO Convention 158) sets out the international 
standards in relation to employment protection.76 It requires a valid reason for termination, which is 
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker, or the operational requirements of the 
workplace.  
ILO Convention 158 states that employment cannot be terminated for discriminatory reasons such as 
sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy and absence following maternity leave.77 This 
means that a woman’s employment should be protected while she is absent from work due to 
pregnancy or giving birth.  
The right to just and favourable conditions of work 
The international legal basis of the right 
Labour law focused on working conditions has been developing since the 19th century. The right to 
just remuneration was recognised in the Treaty of Versailles 1919, which established the ILO, the 
revised ILO Constitution of 1946,78 and the UDHR.79 
Article 7 ICESCR protects just and favourable conditions of work, which includes remuneration and 
safe and healthy working conditions. Remuneration must provide for:80 
“(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, 
in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by 
men, with equal pay for equal work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Covenant; …” 
The ILO has also adopted a number of Conventions and Recommendations on minimum wages.81  
                                                          
74 Prostitution Reform Act 2003. See G Abel “A decade of decriminalization: Sex work ‘down under’ but not 
underground” (2014) 14(5) Criminology & Criminal Justice 580.  
75 Roth, above n 69, at 623. 
76 International Labour Organization Termination of Employment Convention (No 158) (ILO Convention 158) 
1412 UNTS 159 (opened for signature 22 June 1982, entered into force 23 November 1985), art 4. New Zealand 
has not ratified ILO Convention 158 but its rules are largely compliant with it: Roth, above n 69, at 632-633.  
77 ILO Convention 158, art 5. 
78 International Labour Organization Constitution, preamble. 
79 UDHR, art 23(3).  
80 ICESCR, art 7(a)(i) and (ii).  
81 Listed in Roth, above n 69, at 635-636. 
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What does the right require? 
The CESCR has stated that the minimum wage should be applied to everybody regardless of their 
occupation. The CESCR has mostly taken a basic needs approach as opposed to distributive fairness 
approach to determining whether remuneration is fair.82 
Of particular relevance is the right to equal remuneration for work of equal value, recognised in art 
7(a)(i) ICESCR.  
Employment rights in the surrogacy context 
Articles 6 and 7 ICESCR mean that: 
 A surrogate’s employment (if she has any) should be protected during her pregnancy and 
birth; 
 A surrogate should not be discriminated against in her employment in relation to her 
pregnancy; and 
 If surrogacy is treated as ‘employment’ itself then: 
o a woman has the right to choose to be employed as a surrogate; 
o a surrogate should be fairly paid for her work; and 
o a surrogate is entitled to safe and healthy working conditions.  
The right to safe and healthy working conditions has particular relevance to the international 
commercial surrogacy context where some surrogates are kept in highly controlled residential 
facilities run by surrogacy agencies during the pregnancy and following the birth.83  
Discrimination against surrogates in employment 
Just like any other pregnant woman, if it can be shown that surrogates are treated unfavourably in 
their workplace because of their gender or their pregnancy, there may be an employment 
discrimination issue. 
Employment discrimination is prohibited in arts 2(2) and 3 ICESCR.  Protection against employment 
discrimination is also included in CERD,84 CEDAW85 and CRPD.86 Article 11(f) CEDAW provides:87 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the 
same rights, in particular: …   (f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working 
conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.” 
The obligation to prohibit unfair discrimination is of immediate effect.88 
                                                          
82 Saul et al, above n 71, at 406-407.  
83 Trowse and Cooper, above n 25, at 401-405; and Tanderup, above n 25, at 494. 
84 CERD, art 5(e)(i). 
85 CEDAW, art 11(1)(a). 
86 CRPD, art 27.  
87 CEDAW, art 11(f). 
88 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 18: The Right to 
Work (Art 6 of the Covenant), above n 70, at [19]. 
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Realising employment rights for surrogates in New Zealand 
A surrogate’s employment must be protected while she is on leave before and after the birth. The 
Employment Relations Act 2000 prohibits unjustified dismissal,89 unjustifiable disadvantage,90 and 
unlawful discrimination,91 and provides a range of potential remedies including reinstatement, 
reimbursement of lost wages, compensation for loss of dignity, and costs. 
New Zealand law also provides for female employees who are pregnant to take ten days of unpaid 
special leave for reasons connected with pregnancy,92 up to twelve months of paid carer’s leave and 
extended leave,93 and in some circumstances, volunteer’s leave.94 Paid parental leave is available if 
the baby is stillborn or dies, and in many situations, up to five days sick leave95 and up to three days 
bereavement leave are also available.96 
However, surrogates are otherwise in a vulnerable position in relation to employment leave. Recent 
amendments to the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 provide greater flexibility 
for people who are not the birth parents of a child to take leave to care for it, and therefore benefit 
the intended parents of a surrogate-born child. 97  
Beyond the ten days of special leave allowed for a pregnant woman, there is no specific provision for 
employment leave for postnatal recovery, which is normally thought to take around six weeks. This is 
because leave is connected to caring for the child, rather than for recovering from the birth. In 
practice, this may be resolved by the surrogate and the intended parents agreeing to share the carer’s 
leave entitlements.  
It would be preferable for the law to provide directly for situations when the woman who gives birth 
does not go on to care for the child, and clarify her entitlements to a period of employment leave, 
rather than relying on the ability of the parties to negotiate. The reliance on informal arrangements is 
particularly difficult given that surrogacy contracts are not enforceable in New Zealand,98 and so a 
surrogate would have little means of redress if the intended parents reneged from the agreed leave 
arrangements. 
If acting as a surrogate is treated as ‘employment’, then a surrogate has a right to fair remuneration.99  
Surrogacy fits within the type of gender-segregated profession that is typically undervalued.   
The right to safe working conditions is relevant to international surrogacy but is less likely to be an 
issue in New Zealand where there are no industrialised surrogacy clinics.  
                                                          
89 Section 103(1)(a). 
90 Section 103(1)(b). 
91 Section 103(1)(c). See also Human Rights Act 1993, s 22(1).  
92 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, s 15.   
93 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, Parts 1 and 3.  
94 For service in the Armed Forces see Volunteers Employment Protection Act 1973. 
95 Holidays Act 2003, s 65.  
96 Holidays Act 2003, ss 69-70.  
97 A Masselot and I Schelp “Parental Leave and Surrogacy: Caring is Everything” in Annick Masselot and Rhonda 
Powell (eds) Perspectives on Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy and Rights (Centre for 
Commercial and Corporate Law Inc, Christchurch, 2019) 137-152 and R Russell and A Masselot “Why do we care? 
The shifting concept of care in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom” (2020) 36(2) IJCCLIR 81. 
98 HART Act, s 14. 
99 Minimum Wage Act 1983. The current minimum wage for employees aged over 16 is $18.90 per hour: 
Minimum Wage Order 2020. This is reviewed annually.  
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Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s employment rights 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s 
employment rights: 
 How can New Zealand employment law protect the needs of surrogates for postnatal 
recovery? 
 How can New Zealand employment law prevent discrimination against surrogates? 
 If it were accepted that commercial surrogacy could take place in New Zealand, how should 
the work be valued?  
 If it were accepted that commercial surrogacy could take place in New Zealand, how would 
the issues around pay-equity that arise in other gender-segregated industries be avoided? 
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PART THREE: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
Introduction  
The CRC contains a number of rights relevant to the child born of a surrogacy arrangement. Foremost 
amongst these is the obligation to consider the best interests of the child (art 3 CRC). Other important 
rights for the child of a surrogacy arrangement considered in this part are: 
 the right to nationality (art 7); 
 the right to identity (art 8); and 
 the right not to be sold (art 35). 
New Zealand ratified the CRC in 1993, and is also a party to ICESCR (ratified in 1978) and the Optional 
Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OPSC)100 
(ratified in 2011). New Zealand has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol on a Communications 
Procedure (CRC-OPCP),101 which enables individual complaints to be taken to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, although is likely to do so. 
Other rights relevant to the rights of the child in the surrogacy context, but not considered in detail in 
this Part include: 
 the right to family reunification (art 10); and  
 the right to be free from discrimination (art 2), especially in relation to discrimination for 
“reasons of parentage or other conditions” (art 10(3) ICESCR). 
The Best Interests of the Child 
The key overarching right in relation to the rights of the child in the surrogacy context is the best 
interests of the child. 
The international legal basis of the right  
The notion that children are entitled to special care and assistance was first recognised in art 25(2) 
UDHR which provided, in the context of the right to an adequate standard of living that: 
“(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.”  
Subsequently, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959 provided that:102 
“the child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law 
and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and 
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.”  
                                                          
100 Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 2171 UNTS 227 (opened 
for signature 25 May 2000, entered into force 18 January 2002), preamble and art 8. 
101 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure GA Res 66/138, 
A/RES/66/138 (opened for signature 28 February 2012, entered into force 14 April 2014), preamble and arts 2 
and 3. 
102 Declaration of the Rights of the Child GA Res 1386 (1959) at [2]. 
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Article 3 CRC provides: 
“1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his 
or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal 
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take 
all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the 
care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent 
authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their 
staff, as well as competent supervision.” [emphasis added] 
As well as art 3, individual articles of the CRC also recognise the best interests of the child including 
art 9 (separation from parents), art 10 (family reunification), art 18 (parental responsibilities), and art 
21 (adoption). Reference to the child’s best interests is also found in the CRC-OPSC, and the CRC-OPCP. 
Aside from recognition of the best interests of the child in the CRC, the principle is also recognised in 
CEDAW,103 and the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect to 
Intercountry Adoption 1993.104  
The best interests of the child principle is just one of four key guiding principles that underpins the 
other rights in CRC. The other three principles are respect for the views of the child (art 12 CRC), the 
right to life, survival and development (art 6 CRC) and non-discrimination (art 2 CRC).105 
What does the best interests of the child require? 
Article 3(1) CRC requires that: “[s]imply put, all adults, particularly law makers and policy bodies, 
should do what is best for children; but it is apparent that there is a lack of agreement, internationally 
and nationally, about what constitutes children’s interests, let alone their ‘best’ interests.”106 The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has said that the best interests principle is “a dynamic concept 
that requires an assessment appropriate to the specific context.”107 It is a complex concept and its 
content must be determined on a case-by-case basis.108 It requires “the development of a rights-based 
approach, engaging all actors, to secure the holistic, physical, psychological, moral and spiritual 
integrity of the child and promote his or her human dignity.”109 
                                                          
103 CEDAW, arts 5(b) and 16(1)(d). 
104 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption 1870 UNTS 
167 (opened for signature 29 May 1993, entered into force 1 May 1995), art 1(a). 
105 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 5: General Measures of Implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 (27 November 2003). 
106 Adam McBeth, Justine Nolan and Simon Rice The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2011) at 432. 
107 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 14: on the right of the child to have his or her best 
interests taken as a primary consideration, above n 9, at [1]. 
108 At [32]. 
109 At [5]. 
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The Committee on the Rights of the Child asserts that the child’s best interests is a threefold concept 
comprising:110 
 A substantive right: This is the right of the child to have their best interests assessed and taken 
as a primary consideration whenever a decision is to be made concerning a child. 
 A fundamental, interpretative legal principle: If a legal provision is open to more than one 
interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively serves the child’s best interests 
should be chosen. 
 A rule of procedure: Whenever a decision is to be made that will affect a specific child or group 
of children, then the decision-making process must include an evaluation of the possible 
impact (positive or negative) of the decision on the child or children concerned. 
In terms of the nature and scope of obligations imposed on states under art 3, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child is of the view that art 3 establishes a framework with three different types of 
obligations for state parties:111 
 The obligation to ensure that the child’s best interests are appropriately integrated and 
consistently applied in actions by public institutions including administrative and judicial 
proceedings which impact on children. 
 The obligation to ensure that all judicial and administrative decisions as well as policies and 
legislation demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been a primary consideration. 
 The obligation to ensure that the interests of the child have been assessed and taken into 
account as a primary consideration in actions taken by the private sector. 
Article 3 implicitly recognises that while children are in possession of their own rights, inevitably adults 
will be making decisions on a child’s behalf. The “best interests” principle therefore gives decision 
makers the authority to substitute their own decisions for either the child’s or the parents’, providing 
it is based on the best interests of the child.112  
There is an ongoing debate at the international level and within individual domestic jurisdictions as to 
the paramountcy, primacy or otherwise of the best interests principle. Importantly, art 3(1) provides 
for the best interests of the child to be “among the first considerations rather than requiring them to 
be the first considered or favoured.”113 The Committee on the Rights of the Child puts it this way:114  
“The expression ‘primary consideration’ means that the child’s best interests may not be 
considered on the same level as all other considerations. This strong position is justified by 
the special situation of the child: dependency, maturity, legal status and, often, voicelessness. 
Viewing the best interests of the child as “primary” requires a consciousness about the place 
that children’s interests must occupy in all actions and a willingness to give priority to those 
interests in all circumstances, but especially when an action has an undeniable impact on the 
children concerned.”   
                                                          
110 At [6]. 
111 At [14]. 
112 McBeth et al, above n 106, at 432 citing Geraldine van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998) at 46. 
113 McBeth et al, above n 106, at 432. 
114 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 14: on the right of the child to have his or her best 
interests taken as a primary consideration, above n 9, at [37] and [40]. 
23 
 
A number of commentators nevertheless argue that the best interests of the child should in fact be 
“the” primary consideration rather than “a” primary consideration.115 Many court decisions also give 
primacy to the best interests of the child.116 However, the language of art 3(1) and the drafting history 
of CRC is clear that the best interests of the child was intended to be “a” primary consideration.  
The best interests of the child in the surrogacy context 
In the surrogacy context, the best interests of the child has been invoked in a number of different and 
complex scenarios. Mostly these have been in situations where no other CRC right directly addresses 
the issue. In essence, the best interests principle is used as either a substantive right or a fundamental 
interpretive principle (the first two elements of the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s conception 
of the right – noted above). 
First, in light of cases where there is risk of exploitation, abuse or neglect of the child born of a 
surrogacy arrangement by the intending parent(s),117 it has been argued that the best interests of the 
child may require the parenting ability of the intending parent(s) to be subject to a suitability 
assessment.118 Such an assessment would be contentious especially since it is not required in the 
context of orthodox family formation, and would arguably interfere with the intending parent(s)’ right 
to privacy and family life (see discussion in the Introduction about resolving conflicts between rights). 
Second, in states where domestic commercial surrogacy is prohibited, but intending parent(s) enter 
into an international commercial surrogacy arrangement, the best interests principle has been used 
to outweigh public policy concerns regarding payments in surrogacy arrangements. Essentially, 
domestic courts have used the best interests principle to find that even though there is a public policy 
rationale against commercial surrogacy, given that it has occurred, the best approach is to approve 
the arrangement (whether by grant of a visa, citizenship or an adoption order) as this is in the overall 
best interests of the child. For example, in the English case of Re L (a child), the judgment explicitly 
considered the welfare of the child to be the paramount consideration, and it was found to outweigh 
public policy considerations regarding payments in surrogacy arrangements.119  
A potential risk in the surrogacy context is where either the surrogate mother or the intending 
parent(s) change their mind about giving up or receiving the resulting child. A surrogacy arrangement 
which leads to prolonged custody battles and movement of a child between families and households 
is clearly not in the best interests of the child.120 If a custody dispute does eventuate, then the best 
interests principle can and should be used to resolve it as expeditiously as possible.121  
                                                          
115 For example, Bantekas and Oette argue that the children’s “best interests” principle is paramount in any 
determination of matters pertinent to children. See Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette International Human Rights 
Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge, 2016) at 530. 
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Infertility Center of America Inc (1997) 700 A.2d 453. 
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The best interests principle can therefore be used to help decision makers find solutions to practical 
and legal dilemmas which are consistent (or more consistent) with the best interests of the child.  
The best interests of the child in the surrogacy context in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the principle of the best interests of the child is reflected in various ways in the 
legislative framework pertaining to children. For example, s 4(1) of the Care of Children Act 2004 
provides that the welfare and best interests of the child “must be the first and paramount 
consideration” in decisions about the guardianship and day-to-day care of a child. Similarly, s 6 of the 
Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 / Children’s and Young People’s Well-being Act 1989 provides that the 
welfare and interests of the child or young person “shall be the first and paramount consideration”. 
This formulation of the best interests principle in these pieces of legislation clearly asserts that in these 
contexts at least, the best interests of the child is to be “the” primary consideration. 
The best interests of the child is also referred to in various other pieces of legislation including the 
Children’s Commissioner Act 2003, the Adoption (Intercountry) Act 1997, the Family Courts Act 1980, 
and the Family Violence Act 2018. 
The best interests principle is not directly referenced in some of the key pieces of legislation which 
currently regulate surrogacy arrangements in New Zealand: 
 Section 4(a) of the HART Act does provide that one of the guiding principles for people 
exercising powers or functions under the Act is “the health and well-being of children” born 
as a result of the performance of an assisted reproductive procedure, but does not refer 
explicitly to the best interests of the child. 
 The Adoption Act 1955 contains no reference to the best interests of the child. 
 The Status of Children Act 1969 contains no reference to the best interests of the child. 
The ACART Guidelines on Surrogacy Involving Assisted Reproductive Procedures (ACART Guidelines) 
refer to the interests of children in a number of places as follows:122 
 The Preamble notes the HART Act requirements “for the protection and promotion of the 
health, safety, dignity, and rights of all individuals, but particularly those of women and 
children” and the “health and wellbeing of children” (s 4(a) and (b)). 
 Guideline 1 reproduces the principles set out in s 4 of the HART Act. 
 Guideline 2(b)(iii) requires that ECART must be satisfied that the risks associated with a 
surrogacy for any resulting child are justified including the risk that the intending parent(s) 
may change their mind about parenting a resulting child, and the risks to the health and 
wellbeing of a resulting child, including becoming the subject of a dispute if the relationship 
between the surrogate ad intending parents breaks down. 
 Guideline 2(c)(ii) provides that ECART also has to take into account whether the relationship 
between the intending parent(s) and the intending surrogate safeguards the wellbeing of all 
parties especially any resulting child. 
 Guideline 2(c)(iv) requires ECART to consider whether counselling has provided for the 
inclusion of any (existing) children of the parties and so considers the interests of children who 
will be siblings of the new child. 
                                                          
122 ACART Guidelines, above n 33. 
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 Guideline 2(c)(vi) provides that ECART is also to take into account whether the residency of 
the parties safeguards the wellbeing of all parties and especially any resulting child. 
New Zealand’s Information Fact Sheet: International Surrogacy also contains a number of references 
to the child’s interests as follows:123 
 The “vulnerability of children due to a number of their rights not being met” is noted as one 
of the social risks which intending parent(s) should consider before entering an international 
commercial surrogacy arrangement. 
 Reference to “the outcome that is in the best interests of the child” and steps taken by the 
intending parent(s) to preserve the child’s identity is listed in the appendix as one of the 
matters Ministers may consider in deciding whether to grant a visa or citizenship to a baby 
born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement.  
From these existing references then, it seems that the “best interests” principle is not reflected as 
comprehensively as it could be in relevant statutes and other guidance in the surrogacy context. This 
concern was noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, albeit as a comment at a general 
level, when it recommended in 2016 that New Zealand:124 
“strengthen its efforts to ensure that this right [art 3] is appropriately integrated and 
consistently interpreted and applied in all legislative, administrative and judicial proceedings 
and decisions, in particular with regard to family law, social security legislation, children in 
care (particularly Maori children), sentencing of parents and in the refugee determination 
process. The State party is encouraged to develop procedures and criteria to provide 
guidance to all relevant professionals for determining the best interests of the child in every 
area and for giving it due weight as a primary consideration.” 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the best interests of the child 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the best interests of 
the child: 
 How should the best interests of the child be promoted in any surrogacy law reform? 
 Whether the guiding principles applying to decision makers under the HART Act (currently 
reflected in s 4) should explicitly include the best interests of the child? 
 Whether the Adoption Act 1955 and the Status of Children Act 1969 should include reference 
to the best interests of the child? 
 Whether Oranga Tamariki’s current screening procedures for intended parent(s) as adoptive 
applicants are adequate? 
  
                                                          
123 New Zealand Government Information Fact Sheet: International Surrogacy (March 2019) at 1 and 5. 
124 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the fifth periodic report of New Zealand UN 
Doc CRC/C/NZL/CO/5 (21 October 2016) at [16]. 
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The Child’s Right to Nationality 
International legal basis of the right 
The rights to nationality and the prevention of statelessness find their origins in art 15 UDHR which 
provides that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.” 
In relation to children, this right is further expanded upon in art 24 ICCPR which provides: 
“1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State. 
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.” [emphasis added] 
Since 1990, the child’s right to nationality and protection from statelessness has been reflected in art 
7 CRC which provides: 
“1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to 
a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared 
for by his or her parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their 
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in 
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.” [emphasis added] 
Article 7 is a multi-faceted right with a number of discrete elements including birth registration, the 
right to know and be cared for by his/her parents, and the right to nationality. In the surrogacy context, 
a key concern is the right to nationality and protection from statelessness. 
It is important to note that the right to nationality is closely linked to the right to recognition as a 
person before the law. This is found in art 16 ICCPR which provides that “Everyone shall have the right 
to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” 
In addition to these human rights documents, there are two international treaties specifically 
concerned with the phenomenon of statelessness – the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons125 and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.126 The 1954 
Convention defines a stateless person as someone “who is not considered as a national by any State 
under operation of its law”127 and provides for certain minimum standards of treatment of stateless 
persons. It includes obligations relating to the provision of identity papers and travel documents, and 
the facilitation of naturalisation for stateless persons.128 The 1961 Convention is aimed at reduction 
of statelessness and contains rules for the conferral and non-withdrawal of citizenship to prevent 
                                                          
125 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (CSSP) 360 UNTS 117 (opened for signature 1954, 
entered into force 6 June 1960). 
126 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS) 989 UNTS 175 (opened for signature 30 August 1961, 
entered into force 13 December 1975). 
127 CSSP, art 1(1). 
128 CSSP, arts 27, 28 and 32. 
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cases of statelessness from arising. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees notes that by setting out 
rules to limit the occurrence of statelessness, the Convention gives effect to art 15 UDHR.129 The 
Convention specifically addresses the prevention of statelessness at birth by requiring states to grant 
citizenship to children born on their territory, or born to their nationals abroad, who would otherwise 
be stateless.130  
New Zealand has ratified the ICCPR and the CRC. In terms of statelessness, New Zealand acceded to 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in 2006, but is not yet a party to the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has 
recommended that New Zealand should accede to the 1954 Convention and establish a formal 
statelessness determination procedure in legislation. In 2019, as part of its universal periodic review 
before the UN Human Rights Council, New Zealand agreed to consider acceding to the 1954 
Convention.131 The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) will lead work on 
considering whether to accede.  
What does the right to nationality require? 
The HRC, commenting on art 24(3) ICCPR, has said that the purpose of the right to nationality is “to 
prevent a child from being afforded less protection by society and the State because he is stateless.”132 
While there is not necessarily an obligation on states to give their nationality to every child born in 
their territory, “States are required to adopt every appropriate measure, both internally and in 
cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has a nationality when he is born.”133 
Historically, determining what nationality a child would acquire was based on the Latin maxims of jus 
soli and jus sanguinis. The jus soli principle provides that a child may automatically attain the 
nationality of the state in which they were born. The jus sanguinis principle provides that a child 
attains nationality via descent from his/her parents. These two principles of citizenship by birth and 
citizenship by descent are still reflected in the laws of many states today. 
The right to nationality in the surrogacy context 
The right to nationality arises most sharply in the context of international (commercial) surrogacy 
arrangements. A potential scenario is for neither the birth state of the surrogate mother nor the home 
state of the intending parent(s) to grant the child nationality or citizenship at birth. In this situation, 
the child can often be left in “legal limbo” or technically stateless. A challenge for the home state of 
the intending parent(s) in this context, and a reason for delay in granting parenthood and thus 
nationality, is the state’s interest in guarding against potential sale and trafficking of children.  
The consequences of delay in granting or failing to grant nationality can vary. In a best case scenario, 
the home state of the intending parent(s) may eventually recognise parenthood (such as via an 
adoption order), and grant nationality. For example, the ECtHR has held that overly restrictive 
                                                          
129 CRS, at 3 (Introductory note). 
130 CRS, arts 1 and 4. 
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surrogacy laws that offend the parent-child relationship and fail to grant nationality to the child 
undermine the child’s identity within the society of its intending parent(s).134 In this type of scenario 
then, the child is only temporarily stateless, with nationality and ‘limping’ legal parentage eventually 
recognised.  
An alternative scenario is where the intending parent(s) spend many months or even years in the state 
of the surrogate mother attempting to secure travel documents to take their child back to the state 
of the intending parent(s).135 For example, in Balaz v Anand Municipality, German intending parents 
commissioned an Indian surrogate mother who gave birth to twin boys.136 The boys were however left 
stateless for two years as neither India nor Germany would grant nationality. Eventually the case was 
resolved by requiring the intending parent(s) to adopt the twins through the intercountry adoption 
process. In a worst case scenario, where there is a legal stalemate, some intending parent(s) have 
resorted to smuggling their surrogate baby into their home state.137 
Where children born of surrogacy are rendered temporarily stateless and without a nationality, this 
may also suggest unlawful discrimination. Article 2(1) CRC provides that child’s rights are to be 
“respect[ed] and ensure[d] … without discrimination of any kind … [including] birth or other status.”138 
Art 10(3) ICESCR also provides that “[s]pecial measures of protection and assistance should be taken 
on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or 
other conditions.” It has been argued that denying citizenship to children because of the 
circumstances of their birth or because of the actions (or infertility) of their parents, circumstances 
over which they had no control, may amount to unlawful discrimination.139  
Realising the right to nationality in the surrogacy context in New Zealand 
The legislative framework for recognising the right to nationality in New Zealand includes the 
Citizenship Act 1977 and the Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships Registration Act 1995. Since 
2006, a child born in New Zealand is a New Zealand citizen if at least one parent is a New Zealand 
citizen, or is entitled to remain in New Zealand indefinitely (eg is a permanent resident).140 A child born 
in New Zealand who is not a New Zealand citizen is deemed to hold the most favourable immigration 
status of either parent. A child born overseas with New Zealand citizen parent(s) (where the parent(s) 
were not themselves born overseas) is entitled to New Zealand citizenship.141 Current protections 
from statelessness include s 9(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act which allows the Minister of Internal Affairs 
to grant citizenship to someone who would otherwise be stateless.142  
For surrogacy arrangements taking place within New Zealand, the current framework adequately 
protects the right to nationality. For example, under the 1977 Act, the surrogate mother is treated as 
the parent, and so if she is a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident, then the child will 
automatically be a New Zealand citizen.  
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135 Achmad, above n 119, at 207. 
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The situation is more complicated for international (commercial) surrogacy arrangements. In terms of 
current practice, where a child is born of an international commercial surrogacy arrangement with 
intending parent(s) who are New Zealand citizens or permanent residents, the child will not 
automatically be granted New Zealand citizenship.143 This is because New Zealand law recognises the 
surrogate mother and her partner (if she has one) as the legal parents. However, if/when the 
arrangement is formalised via an adoption in the New Zealand courts, then provided the parents are 
New Zealand citizens or permanent residents, the child will become a New Zealand citizen. As 
indicated in the Government Fact Sheet on international surrogacy, the pathway to acquire New 
Zealand citizenship for children born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement which has been 
commissioned by New Zealand citizens or permanent residents, is essentially through an adoption 
order in the New Zealand Family Court.144 Provided that the application and adoption order occur in a 
timely manner, then any child in this situation will ‘only’ be stateless for a short period of time. 
The main issue in New Zealand is therefore around the length of time it takes for the child born of an 
international commercial surrogacy arrangement to acquire New Zealand citizenship and nationality, 
especially if they do not already have an alternative nationality from the surrogate mother. 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to nationality 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the child’s right to 
nationality: 
 Should New Zealand create a unique visa category for children born of an international 
surrogacy arrangement with New Zealand resident intending parent(s) who seek to bring the 
child into New Zealand after birth overseas?  
 Should New Zealand amend the Citizenship Act 1977 to explicitly recognise children born of 
an international surrogacy arrangement with New Zealand commissioning parent(s) as 
automatically entitled to New Zealand citizenship? Should there be a genetic link to one or 
both of the commissioning parent(s)? 
 If a unique visa category and/or unique citizenship recognition is created for children born of 
an international surrogacy arrangement? What sort of requirements/checks are required to 
guard against sale or trafficking in children? 
 Should New Zealand ratify the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons to 
strengthen its protection for stateless persons (including children born stateless as a result of 
an international commercial surrogacy arrangement)? 
 Should New Zealand strengthen its legislative framework for protecting stateless persons 
(including children born stateless as a result of an international commercial surrogacy 
arrangement) by establishing a specific statelessness determination procedure? 
  
                                                          
143 See R Powell “International Surrogacy and Parenthood in New Zealand: Crossing Geographical, Legal and 
Biological Borders” (2017) 29(2) CFLQ 149.  
144 New Zealand Government, above n 123, at 2. 
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The Child’s Right to Identity 
The international legal basis of the right 
At the international level, the legal basis for the child’s right to identity is found in art 8 CRC. Article 8 
provides: 
“1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference. 
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States 
Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing 
speedily his or her identity.” [emphasis added] 
A child’s right to identity is linked to other rights including the right to have and develop a personality 
found in art 22 UDHR:  
“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” [emphasis added] 
It is also closely linked to the right to nationality in art 7.  
What does the child’s right to identity require? 
Michael Freeman describes identity as “… what we know and what we feel is an organising framework 
for holding together our past and our present and it provides some anticipated shape to future life. It 
is an inner personal landscape.”145 There are few rights more basic than the right to identity. Knowing 
one’s identity is a fundamental part of the human experience. To know one’s “inner personal 
landscape” is important; not knowing this information can leave a person feeling as if they are trapped 
in an identity vacuum.146 
Identity is, however, a contested notion. Blauwhoff and Frohn note that the multi-dimensional and 
complex nature of identity shows why no legal definition has been attempted.147 Nevertheless, various 
scholars have attempted to identify the core elements of identity. Giroux and De Lorenzi separate the 
understanding of identity into two parts: static and dynamic. The static aspects of identity concern 
attributes that make one visible to the outside world, for example, physical features, sex, name, 
genetics, and nationality.148 Dynamic aspects of identity, which can change over time, include morals 
and religious and cultural characteristics.149 Article 8 CRC expressly protects nationality, name and 
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family relations – core aspects of static identity. Article 8 also illustrates the state’s duty to protect 
this right, both passively and actively.150 
Achmad identifies three dimensions of the right to identity:151 
 the importance of identity to knowing one’s personal narrative; 
 the importance of identity to knowing one’s cultural and ethnic background; and 
 the importance of identity to knowing one’s genetic origins – the medical and health rationale.  
No matter the precise formulation of the right to identity, at the heart of realisation of the right is the 
availability of information. Realisation of the right to identity therefore requires that identity 
information is accessible and available,152 hence the importance of birth registers recording 
information about parentage. 
The child’s right to identity in the surrogacy context 
In the surrogacy context, issues of hidden parentage abound. The use of a surrogate mother or gamete 
donor may be concealed from a surrogate born child for various reasons. However, children who do 
not know their genetic origins or gestational mother have been found to live in a state of genetic or 
genealogical “bewilderment”153 or “genetic alienation”.154 Surrogate children need to know their 
genetic and cultural backgrounds in order that they may patch their identity together.155 In terms of 
adverse impacts if surrogate-born children do not have access to information about their identity or 
genetic origins, there are risks that a child remains unaware of any hereditary medical conditions and 
diseases, or any unintentional consanguineous relationships.156  
There is related research on the adverse impacts of donor anonymity (also a common part of the 
surrogacy context) on donor-born children. Some mental health professionals are of the view that 
keeping donor information secret could be psychologically and socially harmful to inter-family 
relationships;  they also claim it would be ethically unacceptable.157 The Royal Commission on Assisted 
Human Reproduction in Canada has noted that it could be against the child’s best interests to keep 
the circumstances of conception a secret.158 Of note here is that many donor-conceived children are 
only told about the truth of their conception at time of family crisis.159 Some international research 
suggests that a significant proportion of parents of donor-conceived children choose to conceal this 
information from their children, and the data in New Zealand shows similar results.160 A University of 
Auckland study found that only a quarter of parents had told their children about their donor 
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conception.161 In the surrogacy context, one longitudinal study found that surrogate-born children do 
not experience psychological issues.162 
There are barriers to the realisation of a child’s right to identity in other non-surrogacy contexts too. 
For example, in a natural birth situation, a mother may choose not to register the name of the child’s 
father. Infidelity is another context in which a child may never have full information as to his/her 
genetic origins. It is argued by some commentators that these examples should not undermine 
arguments in favour of the entitlements of surrogate-born children,163 but there may be situations in 
which it seems to be (more) acceptable for secrecy to trump the child’s interests in knowing part of 
their genetic origins.164 
Recognising the child’s right to identity, and in particular the need for a child to have information 
about their genetic origins in case of future health issues, many countries now provide for birth 
registers which record the use of surrogate mothers and/or gamete donors. The information on such 
registers is typically made available to a child once they reach a certain age. In addition to this formal 
measure, in light of growing awareness of the importance of a child knowing their genetic origins, 
anecdotal reports suggest that individual parents are choosing to be open with their surrogate born 
children about their origins. However, some countries do not currently maintain birth registers, and 
even where they do, there may be practical challenges for a child accessing this information. In 
addition, for some commissioning parent(s), for cultural and other reasons, they seek to conceal from 
the child and others, information about the child’s origins. 
If children are unable to access information about their genetic origins, this may also suggest unlawful 
discrimination. As noted above, art 2(1) CRC provides that child’s rights are to be “respect[ed] and 
ensure[d] … without discrimination of any kind … [including] birth or other status.”165 Article 10(3) 
ICESCR also provides that “[s]pecial measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf 
of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other 
conditions.” The inability of children born of surrogacy to access information about their identity 
including their genetic origins may amount to unlawful discrimination. A child should not be  
disadvantaged in terms of their identity on account of the fact that he or she was born to a surrogate 
mother. Children are not responsible for the circumstances of their birth and should not suffer adverse 
consequences for circumstances for which they are not responsible. 
The right to identity in the surrogacy context in New Zealand 
At the domestic level, New Zealand gives effect to art 8 CRC using a variety of legislative and policy 
measures. For example, in its 2010 Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, New Zealand 
highlighted various legislative changes and policy initiatives that recognised the legal, biological and 
cultural dimensions to identity.166 These included: 
 Cultural identity of Māori: Initiatives to foster and protect the cultural identity of Māori such 
as the Māori Language Strategy and Māori language revitalisation programmes. 
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 Policy work on legal parenthood: New Zealand referred to the 2004 report of the Law 
Commission on “New Issues in Legal Parenthood.”167 It noted in particular the impact of social 
change and assisted human reproductive procedures on children and family forms, 
establishing and accessing information on genetic parentage and assigning legal parenthood. 
New Zealand noted that the Ministry of Justice was at the time scoping a work programme to 
address legal parenthood issues. 
 The provisions of the HART Act.  
Key provisions of the HART Act in the context of a child’s right to identity are: 
 Section 3 sets out the purposes of the HART Act and includes the following: 
“(a) to secure the benefits of assisted reproductive procedures, established 
procedures, and human reproductive research for individuals and for society in 
general by taking appropriate measures for the protection and promotion of the 
health, safety, dignity, and rights of all individuals, but particularly those of women 
and children, in the use of these procedures and research; … 
(f) to establish a comprehensive information-keeping regime to ensure that people 
born from donated embryos or donated cells can find out about their genetic origins.” 
 Section 4 sets out the Principles which are to guide decision-makers under the Act. These 
principles include: 
“(a) the health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of an 
assisted reproductive procedure or an established procedure should be an important 
consideration in all decisions about that procedure; 
(b) the human health, safety, and dignity of present and future generations should be 
preserved and promoted; and … 
(e) donor offspring should be made aware of their genetic origins and be able to 
access information about those origins.” 
 Part 3 of the HART Act (Information about donors of donated embryos or donated cells and 
donor offspring) sets up a Register for information about donors (in operation since August 
2005), and provides the framework access to this information. Once a child turns 18, they are 
entitled to access information about their donor.168 
There is no specific reference to the child’s right to identity in the ACART Guidelines.  However, 
provisions which potentially have some bearing on realisation of the child’s right to identity include: 
 At least one of the two intending parents must be a genetic parent – this will assist in practice 
with the child’s access to information about part of their genetic origins and identity.169 
 There must have been discussion, understanding and declared intentions about “any ongoing 
contact” between the parties. An arrangement in favour of future ongoing contact between 
the intending parents and the child with the surrogate mother and/or donor could assist in 
realisation of the child’s right to identity.170 
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 ECART must be satisfied that the risks associated with a surrogacy are justified. One of the 
risks identified is “the health and wellbeing of a resulting child” – the wellbeing of a child could 
be affected in future by lack of information about identity.171 
A surrogacy arrangement will not necessarily undermine the realisation of the right to identity.  So, 
for example, all the parties to an altruistic surrogacy arrangement which takes place in New Zealand, 
with the approval of ECART, could be supportive of the child’s right to identity, and facilitate the 
provision of information to the child about their identity and genetic origins in due course.  
On the other hand, impediments to realisation of the right to identity in the surrogacy context can 
arise. For example:  
 Although this is no longer possible for New Zealand-based surrogacy arrangements, as there 
is now a register to record the donor’s information, there could be donor anonymity in 
international commercial surrogacy arrangements. By the time New Zealand authorities are 
involved in such an arrangement (at the point of immigration and adoption in New Zealand), 
it is effectively too late for anything to be done about this. 
 In New Zealand, even if donor information is recorded on the Register, the intending parent(s) 
could, for cultural or other reasons, choose to conceal the circumstances of their child’s birth 
so that the child is never aware of the involvement of a donor and/or surrogate in their birth.  
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to identity 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the child’s right to 
identity: 
 Would it be useful for the HART Act to include more specific reference to relevant human 
rights such as the right to identity? 
 Would it be useful for the ACART Guidelines to refer explicitly to the child’s right to identity 
(and indeed other rights)? 
 How can provision of information about a child’s genetic origins be ensured? Should intended 
parent(s) in New Zealand be required to disclose the circumstances of their child’s conception 
to them? How could this be enforced or monitored in practice? Should there be automatic 
release of information once the child turns 18? How would this be achieved in practice? 
 How does the requirement for intending parent(s) to adopt their child under the Adoption Act 
1955 operate to inhibit or mask the realisation of the child’s right to identity? 
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The Child’s Right not to be Sold 
International legal basis of the right 
Article 35 CRC provides that: 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to 
prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.” 
The CRC-OPSC, adopted in 2002, provides greater focus on the issue of exploitation of children. Article 
1 provides: 
“States Parties shall prohibit the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography as 
provided for by the present Protocol.”  
Article 2(a) defines the phrase ‘sale of children’ as: 
“any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to 
another for remuneration or any other consideration.” 
Beyond the provisions of CRC and CRC-OPSC, other relevant international legal standards include the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,172 
and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.173 A number of ILO 
conventions are also relevant including ILO 29 Forced or Compulsory Labour,174 ILO 97 Migration for 
Employment,175 ILO 105 Abolition of Forced Labour,176 and ILO 182 on the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour.177 
New Zealand is a party to all of these treaties, although the focus in this section will be on the 
provisions of the CRC and CRC-OPSC given their direct relevance. 
What does the right not to be sold require? 
Article 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC are aimed at exploitative conduct. The list of prohibited acts in the CRC-
OPSC (sexual exploitation, transfer of organs for profit and forced labour) clearly involve exploitation 
and degradation of the child.178 The Preamble to CRC-OPSC refers to the context of “international 
traffic in children” and so adds weight to the argument that the primary aim of art 35 and the Protocol 
is “harmful activities that compromise the best interests of the child.”179 The purpose of the CRC and 
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CRC-OPSC can therefore be described as to “prevent harm to children, to protect children’s rights and 
to promote their best interests.”180 
However, despite this clear aim, the words of art 35 and CRC-OPSC are wide and all-encompassing. 
The drafting history of the latter also makes it clear that states wanted a broad definition of the sale 
of children to “cover activities beyond those contemplated at the time of drafting.”181 Thus, any 
activity which involves ‘transfer,’ ‘remuneration,’ and ‘consideration’ would appear to fall within the 
definition of the sale of a child and so be prohibited.182 
The right not to be sold in the surrogacy context 
The right of a child not to be sold is especially relevant in the context of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements. At first glance, the terms of CRC and CRC-OPSC appear wide enough to clearly cover 
commercial surrogacy contracts. A commercial surrogacy arrangement involves a ‘transaction’ where 
a child is ‘transferred’ from the surrogate mother to the intending parent(s) in exchange for 
‘remuneration’ beyond reimbursement for expenses. This arguably amounts to the ‘sale’ of a child.  
Academic commentators disagree on whether or not commercial surrogacy arrangements are in 
breach of art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC. Some are firmly of the view that commercial surrogacy 
arrangements are in breach of art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC.183 Other commentators take a different view 
and argue that commercial surrogacy involves remuneration to the surrogate for her services in 
carrying and giving birth to a child, rather than payment for purchase of a child.184 A middle view is 
taken by Gerber and O’Byrne who argue that commercial surrogacy is “wholly different in character” 
to the exploitative activities covered by art 35 and CRC-OPSC.185 They argue that commercial surrogacy 
is not about ‘sale’ or ‘transfer’ of a child, but instead about “allocation of responsibility between the 
parties to the arrangement as to the care of the child at different points in time, with the aim of 
bringing to child into its intended family.”186 
At the international level, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has not yet expressed a clear view 
on whether or not commercial surrogacy amounts to prohibited sale of children.187 However, the 
Committee clearly harbours some concerns that at least under “certain circumstances” which it 
suggests involve an absence of “clear” or “proper” regulation, commercial surrogacy arrangements 
“may” amount to sale or “hidden sale” of children.188  
In early 2018, the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children issued a report 
that was sharply critical of commercial surrogacy. She asserted that commercial surrogacy often 
involves abusive practices, and that current responses to regulating commercial surrogacy involve 
direct challenges to the legitimacy of human rights norms by purporting to legalise practices that 
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violate the international prohibition on the sale of children.189 She noted that surrogacy regulations in 
some jurisdictions are designed to enforce contracts, obtain children for intending parents, maintain 
the industry’s profits, and intentionally reject most protections for children or surrogate mothers.190 
Ultimately, she concluded that “the essence” of the commercial surrogacy arrangement is the transfer 
of a child and that “[c]ommercial surrogacy as currently practised usually constitutes sale of children 
as defined under international human rights law.”191  
However, the Special Rapporteur did agree that “[c]ommercial surrogacy could be conducted in a way 
that does not constitute sale of children, if it were clear that the surrogate mother was only being paid 
for gestational services and not for the transfer of the child”.192 She set out a number of conditions to 
be met in order for this to be more than a “legal fiction”193 including that surrogate mothers must be 
accorded the status of the mother at birth, and at birth must be under no legal obligation to transfer 
the child. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, the physical transfer of the child “must be a gratuitous 
act, based on her own post-birth intentions, rather than on any legal or contractual obligation.”194 
Thus, all payments to the surrogate must be before the post-birth transfer of the child, and must be 
non-reimbursable. She asserted that until clear regulatory systems are established, states should 
prohibit commercial surrogacy. In particular, states should not adopt commercial surrogacy 
regulations based on obligatory or automatic enforcement of surrogacy contracts and pre-birth 
parentage orders, for such would make the States “complicit in authorizing practices that constitute 
the sale of children.”195 
A key point to be borne in mind in the context of this debate is that in most cases, commercial 
surrogacy does not result in the actual exploitation or abuse of the resulting child. In rare cases, 
however, it does.196 There are not yet any reports of abuse or exploitation of surrogate-conceived 
children in New Zealand, but it is likely only a matter of time before such a case occurs. 
Realising the right not to be sold in New Zealand in the surrogacy context 
Article 35 and CRC-OPSC are implemented in a variety of ways in New Zealand’s legislative framework 
including: 
 the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993; 
 the Prostitution Reform Act 2003; 
 the Crimes Act 1961; and  
 the Adoption Act 1955 (ss 27A-27D). 
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A number of policy measures also serve to implement New Zealand’s obligations under CRC-OPSC 
such as  the National Plan of Action against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, the 
Children’s Action Plan and the Plan of Action to Prevent People Trafficking.197  
Arguably, s 14(3) of the HART Act also implements (even if unintentionally) the prohibition on the sale 
of children by making commercial surrogacy contracts illegal. However, as discussed above, there is 
an unresolved debate as to whether all commercial surrogacy contracts violate international law, or 
whether they may be permissible in certain circumstances and under certain conditions. 
This issue also arises implicitly in New Zealand in the context of international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements. Even though there is a prohibition on commercial surrogacy arrangements in s 14(3) of 
the HART Act, this does not have extraterritorial effect. New Zealand intending parent(s) therefore 
enter into international commercial surrogacy arrangements which are implicitly tolerated by the New 
Zealand courts who recognise such arrangements via a subsequent adoption order in the Family Court. 
As noted by Judge Ryan however, the policy considerations underlying the prohibition on commercial 
surrogacy in the HART Act are not within the ambit of a Family Court judge hearing an adoption 
application following an international surrogacy arrangement.198 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right not to be sold 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the child’s right not to 
be sold: 
 Does New Zealand’s current practice of implicitly condoning international commercial 
surrogacy arrangements by making adoption orders in favour of New Zealand intending 
parent(s) breach art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC?  
 Should New Zealand prohibit international commercial surrogacy arrangements involving 
New Zealand citizens or permanent residents residing in New Zealand by giving s 14(3) of the 
HART Act extraterritorial effect, in order to better comply with art 35 and CRC-OPSC? 
 On the other hand, if New Zealand was to amend s 14 of the HART Act so as to permit 
commercial surrogacy arrangements in New Zealand, would this lead to a breach of art 35 CRC 
and CRC-OPSC? 
 Should New Zealand explicitly seek the views of the Committee on the Rights of the Child via 
its next periodic state report (due in May 2021) on whether and in what circumstances 
commercial surrogacy arrangements breach art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC?199 
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PART FOUR: RIGHTS OF THE INTENDED PARENT(S) 
Introduction 
There is no particular international human rights treaty that directly addresses the human rights of 
intended parent(s), and the only individual right that is clearly engaged is the right to freedom from 
discrimination.  
Nevertheless, arguments have been advanced that intended parent(s) have the right to reproduce, 
and the right to benefit from scientific advances.  These rights have no clear source in international 
human rights law, but some recognition as arising out of other recognised human rights. Typically, it 
is the discriminatory access to human reproduction and scientific development that is at stake.  
The Intended Parent(s)’ Right to Reproduce 
International legal basis of the right 
There is no internationally recognised right to reproduce. Instead, this position is usually based on one 
or more of the following international human rights:200 
 the right to marry and found a family;  
 the right to health; or 
 the right to respect for private and family life.  
The right to freedom from discrimination in accessing fertility treatment is also engaged.  
In New Zealand, the ‘right to reproduce’ is given effect through the HART Act, ECART procedures and 
state funding of fertility treatment.  
The potential legal bases are now set out. 
The right to marry and found a family 
The right to marry and found a family is recognised in art 16 UDHR and art 23 ICCPR. International 
jurisprudence on this right typically focuses on preventing forced marriages, and allowing planned 
families. This is sometimes argued to extend to the right to fertility treatment.201 
The right to marry and found a family includes ensuring that free and full consent is obtained, 
transparency in any restrictions on marriage due to special factors such as kinship or incapacity, a 
process for marriage registration, and equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses.202 Most 
relevantly:203 
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“The right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and 
live together. When States parties adopt family planning policies, they should be 
compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and should, in particular, not be 
discriminatory or compulsory.” 
The HRC issued General Comment 19 on the scope of art 23 in 1990. General Comment 19 does not 
mention rights associated with access to assisted reproductive treatment, or surrogacy, although this 
is likely because these issues were barely on the horizon at the time.  
The right to health 
Infertility may be understood as an illness or as a disability. To the extent that it is an illness, then the 
right to health is engaged. The right to health is recognised in art 25 UDHR and art 12(1) ICESCR. The 
right to health was discussed in Part Two in relation to the rights of the surrogate.  
The right to health includes a number of freedoms, and in particular the freedom to control one’s 
health and body, sexual and reproductive freedom, the freedom from forced medical treatment and 
the freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.204  
The ICESCR provides for progressive realisation of the rights protected, including the right to health, 
and acknowledges the constraints on states placed by limits in availability of resources.205 States are 
immediately obliged to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards realisation of the rights 
and to guarantee that the rights are exercised without discrimination.206 
The right to privacy  
The right to privacy was discussed in Part Two on the rights of the surrogate, and similar 
considerations apply to intended parent(s).  
The most relevant iteration of the right to privacy is art 17 ICCPR, which states that: “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation”.207 Complaints about breaches of art 17 often also 
invoke the rights to non-discrimination (arts 2 and 26 ICCPR) and family life (art 23 ICCPR). 
The right to privacy is directly relevant to sexual and reproductive matters and has been invoked in 
HRC proceedings under the individual complaint mechanism related to the criminalisation of 
homosexuality208 and denial of access to lawful abortion.209 
The right to privacy is not absolute. The text of art 17 allows for limitations provided that they are not 
unlawful or arbitrary. The HRC has stated that, although limitations on the right to privacy are 
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permissible if they are in accordance with the law, any law that limits the right must itself be consistent 
with the aims and objectives of the ICCPR.210 
What does the right to reproduce require? 
As well as the precise legal status, the nature of obligations associated with the right to reproduce is 
disputed. In scholarship, some argue that the right to reproduce may only be exercised by those who 
can naturally reproduce.211 Others reject the inclusion of reproductive treatment under the right due 
to fear of introducing positive obligations upon the state to provide access to it.212 The most common 
position is that the significance of reproducing is universal and therefore reproduction in all its forms 
should be protected.213  
The ECtHR has confirmed that the right to respect for private life includes respect for decisions both 
to have and not to have a child and that “the right of a couple to conceive a child and to make use of 
medically assisted procreation for that purpose is also protected by [the right to privacy] as such a 
choice is an expression of private and family life”.214 
Limitations on the right to reproduce (and the subsequent state obligation of non-interference) may 
properly exist in some instances where there is either a broad social effect or a high risk of substantial 
harm to the child.  
The ECtHR has found that there is no absolute right to adopt and receive a child, including by 
surrogacy.215 By contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that Costa Rica's 
prohibition on IVF constituted a breach of the right to reproduce.216 The jurisprudence of these courts 
is not binding on New Zealand.  
Application to the surrogacy context 
The right to reproduce, if recognised, could lead to an argument that intended parent(s) have a right 
to access surrogacy. This argument could have three aspects: 
 the right to access fertility treatment to create a surrogate pregnancy;  
 the right to form surrogacy contracts to regulate the arrangement; and 
 the right to state funded fertility treatment to create a surrogacy.  
There is an obvious interaction with the right to freedom from discrimination, particularly related to 
access to fertility treatment for particular groups. In New Zealand it is illegal to discriminate on the 
grounds of sex, marital status and sexual orientation.217 Surrogacy may therefore not be denied for 
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these reasons. If state funding is available for such assisted reproduction, then it should be available 
in a non-discriminatory manner.  
Realising the right to reproduce in New Zealand  
It cannot be said unequivocally that there is a right to reproduce in New Zealand law. There is no right 
to reproduce in NZBORA, and neither is there inclusion of foundational rights such as the right to 
health or the right to found a family. The right to privacy is recognised in New Zealand law as part of 
NZBORA. 
In New Zealand, the right to marry and form a family is the basis of the laws on marriage equality218 
and adoption equality.219 This means that people of all genders and sexual orientations should have 
the ability both to marry and to adopt children.  
Section 19 of NZBORA recognises the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds in the 
Human Rights Act 1993. The prohibited grounds of discrimination include marital status, disability, 
age, and sexual orientation.220 As sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of discrimination, same sex 
couples have the same rights to access artificial reproductive procedures as other individuals. 
Certain types of reproductive activities, including any surrogacy that utilises assisted reproductive 
procedures,221 can only take place with ethics approval from ECART. Each application for surrogacy is 
determined on a case by case basis with reference to the ACART Guidelines. The ACART Guidelines 
require ECART to weigh up a series of relevant factors and consider whether any surrogacy may go 
ahead.  ECART consent is nearly always given.222 
Access to assisted reproductive procedures is not addressed by the HART Act. There are no particular 
express limitations on access, such as medical infertility or restrictions to married couples, or people 
of sound mental health. The ACART Guidelines on surrogacy do create some restrictions. They require 
that one or both of the intended parents has a genetic link to the proposed child, and that the parties 
are not proposing surrogacy purely as a matter of social choice or personal convenience. 223  
There has been little judicial consideration of the legitimacy of any limitation in access to reproductive 
health treatment, including surrogacy, in New Zealand. Evidence of challenges in accessing assisted 
reproductive treatment is primarily anecdotal.224  
There may also be medical reasons which prevent fertility providers from providing assisted 
reproductive treatment to particular people. In CBA v LKJ, a 45-year old single woman with mental 
health issues claimed that her fertility provider’s refusal to provide her with assisted reproductive 
                                                          
218 The Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, amended the definition of marriage to read 
“marriage means the union of 2 people, regardless of their sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity”: Marriage 
Act 1955, s 2(1). 
219 By including same sex couples in the definition of ‘spouses’, the adoption law automatically applied.  
220 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1).  
221 ECART consent is not required if the surrogate’s pregnancy is accomplished without medical assistance. 
222 See the ECART statistics referred to in the Introduction above. 
223 ACART Guidelines, above n 33.  
224 For example, the Sunday Star Times in August 2019 interviewed a male same-sex couple who had established 
a Givealittle campaign to fund $25,000 for IVF treatment for a surrogate. See Hannah Martin “Gay couple have 
to raise $25,000 for IVF; want fertility treatment funded for same-sex couples” The Sunday Star Times (online 
ed, 11 August 2019). See also “’Why should I be punished for his mistakes?’: Women’s plea to have IVF baby 
with jailed husband” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 4 May 2017). 
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treatment breached the Human Rights Act 1993.225 The Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT) found 
that the fertility provider’s overall failure to provide treatment to the woman constituted 
discrimination but that the discrimination was not unlawful.  The HRRT took into account the fertility 
service’s legal obligations under the NZS8181 Fertility Services principles and the Health and Disability 
Services (Safety) Act 2001, two legal documents underpinned by the s 4 principles of HART, the Code 
of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights and the common law duty for medical 
practitioners to comply with a standard of reasonable care and skill.  
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to reproduce 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the intended parents’ 
right to reproduce: 
 Is the ACART requirement of a genetic connection between at least one intended parent and 
the surrogate-born child justified?  
 Should surrogacy be limited to people experiencing medical or social infertility? 
 Is state funding of reproductive treatment discriminatory?  
 Should surrogacy contracts be enforceable? 
 Should there be provision for state-funding of the costs of surrogacy (beyond the assisted 
reproductive treatment)? 
  
                                                          
225 CBA v LKJ [2014] NZHRRT 13. 
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The Intended Parent(s)’ Right to Science 
One under-explored aspect of the rights of intended parent(s) in the surrogacy context is the right to 
share in the benefits of scientific advancement. 
The international legal basis of the right 
The ‘right to science’ is found in art 27 UDHR as follows: 
“(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy 
the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” 
Subsequently, art 15 ICESCR provided that:  
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development 
and the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable 
for scientific research and creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the 
encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific 
and cultural fields.” 
 
Despite this recognition, the right to share in the benefits of science (or the ‘right to science’ as it is 
sometimes known) has been described as the “Sleeping Beauty” of human rights.226 In 2009, one 
commentator noted that the right to science was “so obscure and its interpretation so neglected that 
the overwhelming majority of human rights advocates, governments, and international human rights 
bodies appear to be oblivious to its existence.”227 Since 2009, there has been growing interest from 
international mechanisms in the right to science. In 2009, UNESCO held an experts’ meeting on the 
right,228 and in 2012 Farida Shaheed, the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, reported on 
the normative content of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.229 
                                                          
226 Māmari Stephens “Rights to Culture, Language and Education – A Tricephalos” in Margaret Bedggood, Kris 
Gledhill and Ian McIntosh (eds) International Human Rights Law in Aotearoa New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2017) 737 at 745, citing E Riedel “Sleeping Beauty or Let Sleeping Dogs Lie?: The Right of Everyone 
to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications (REBSPA)” in H Hestermeyer and others (eds) 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011) 503 at 503. 
227 Audrey Chapman “Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its 
Applications” (2009) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights 1 at 1. 
228 UNESCO Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications UN 
Doc SHS/RSP/HRS-GED/2009/PI/H/1 (16-17 July 2009). 
229 United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida 
Shaheed: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 
2012). 
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In April 2020, CESCR adopted a general comment on “Science and economic, social and cultural 
rights.”230 
What does the right to science require? 
‘Science’ is a complex phenomenon to be the subject of a human right.231 There is not yet any 
international consensus as to what a human rights approach to science entails, let alone specification 
of the kinds of obligations this right imposes on states.232 However, in her 2012 report, the Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights noted that the right to science is usually regarded as a means 
to advance the realisation of other human rights and to address “the needs common to all 
humanity.”233 She identified the normative content of the right as including: 
 access by everyone without discrimination to the benefits of science and its applications, 
including scientific knowledge; 
 opportunities for all to contribute to the scientific enterprise and freedom indispensable for 
scientific research; 
 participation of individuals and communities in decision-making and the related right to 
information; and 
 an enabling environment fostering the conservation, development and diffusion of science 
and technology. 
One of the complexities with the right to science is that science can work to both promote and 
undermine human rights. At the time of the drafting of ICESCR in the 1950s, the relationship between 
science and human rights was viewed quite positively, but by the 1970s, science came to be seen as a 
threat to human rights.234 Concerns included the impact of electronic communications and computer 
data systems on the right to privacy, and the risks to human rights through medical advances such as 
artificial insemination.235 Thus, the 1975 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological 
Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind presented science as a resource to 
promote the realisation of human rights,236 but also expressed concerns that science not be used to 
the “detriment of human rights and freedoms and the dignity of the human person.”237 
In terms of sharing the benefits of science, art 15 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights 2005, adopted under the auspices of UNESCO, states that “benefits resulting from any scientific 
research and its applications should be shared with society as a whole and within the international 
community, in particular with developing countries”.238 The drafting history of art 15 suggests that the 
term “benefits” is to be understood as material benefits that every person should be able to enjoy in 
                                                          
230 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 25: Science and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights UN Doc E/C.12/GC/25 (7 April 2020). 
231 Stephens, above n 226, at 745. 
232 Chapman, above n 227, at 3. 
233 United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida 
Shaheed: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, above n 229, at [2]. 
234 Chapman, above n 227, at 2. 
235 Chapman, above n 227, at 2. 
236 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of 
Mankind GA Res 3384 (1975), art 7. 
237 At art 8. 
238 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights UN Doc SHS/EST/BIO/06/1 (19 October 2005), 
art 15.  
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everyday life.239 This therefore requires states to distribute the applications of scientific progress to 
everyone. However, there is a clear tension between the public interest in the benefits of science 
being shared by all, and the private interest in the intellectual property interests generated by 
scientific research. 
The right to science has clear links to other rights including the right to health. Article 15(1)(b) ICESCR 
has been described as clearly involving progress in matters of health science.240 However, scientific 
advances are often driven by market considerations which can ultimately have a negative impact on 
the right to health. The 2009 Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress 
and Its Applications notes that:241 
“Scientific advances in medicine have helped to cure more diseases and enhance the quality 
of life. However, these advances are driven primarily by market considerations that often do 
not correspond to the health needs of the world’s population as a whole, thus affecting the 
right to health.” 
Finally, it is worth noting that art 7 ICCPR recognises the potential hazards of science. In addition to 
no one being subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, “no one 
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” 
The right to science in the surrogacy context 
In the surrogacy context, the right to science has been primarily used to support intended parent(s)’ 
asserted right to reproduce and found a family.  However, there has been no detailed analysis of the 
right in the surrogacy context. Rather, the invoking of the right seems to depend on an assertion that 
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications means a right of access by 
intended parent(s) to the material benefits of artificial reproduction technologies like surrogacy. 
There has been limited further analysis of the scope and content of the right beyond that bland 
assertion, and many questions remain unanswered. What are the limits of the right? If a state prohibits 
access to surrogacy, is that a breach of intended parent(s) right to science? If a state prohibits 
commercial surrogacy and/or international surrogacy, is that a breach of intended parent(s) right to 
science? Is a state obliged to proactively facilitate access to surrogacy and other ARTs? How do the 
concepts of progressive realisation and maximum available resources apply in the surrogacy context? 
The right to science in the surrogacy context in New Zealand 
In common with other ESC rights, there is no statutory recognition of the right to science in New 
Zealand. In addition, the right to science in New Zealand has received little attention or commentary 
either at the domestic level or via international monitoring mechanisms. In its 2017-2018 engagement 
with CESCR, neither New Zealand in its state report nor the Committee in its concluding observations 
                                                          
239 Chapman, above n 227, at 9. 
240 Margaret Bedggood and Kris Gledhill “The Essentials of Life” in Margaret Bedggood, Kris Gledhill and Ian 
McIntosh (eds) International Human Rights Law in Aotearoa New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2017) 
683 at 721. 
241 UNESCO Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, above 
n 228, at 13. 
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made any comment on New Zealand’s implementation of art 15 ICESCR.242 In earlier engagements 
with CESCR, New Zealand referred to a number of initiatives to illustrate its implementation of the 
right to science. In its 2009 report, New Zealand listed a number of statutes including the HART Act 
that “seek to uphold human rights with duties, powers and obligations for those concerned with 
scientific practice”.243  
Unsurprisingly, the right to science in the surrogacy context in New Zealand has received virtually no 
attention. 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to science 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the intended parents’ 
right to science: 
 Do any limitations on access to surrogacy (for example any prohibition on surrogacy, 
prohibition on commercial surrogacy, prohibition on international surrogacy) interfere with 
intended parent(s) right to science? 
 Is New Zealand obliged to proactively facilitate access to surrogacy (and other ARTs) in order 
to meet its obligations to fulfil the right to science? 
 
  
                                                          
242 CESCR Fourth periodic report submitted by New Zealand under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant UN Doc 
E/C.12/NZL/4 (6 October 2017); CESCR Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of New Zealand UN 
Doc E/C.12/NZL/CO/4 (1 May 2018). 
243 CESCR Third periodic report submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant  (New 
Zealand) UN Doc E/C.12/NZL/3 (17 January 2011) at [743]. 
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PART FIVE: QUESTIONS REQUIRING CONSIDERATION 
Introduction 
In this Part, we collate the questions from Parts Two-Four. We suggest that in any future New Zealand 
law reform exercise concerning surrogacy that the questions below need to be considered and 
addressed. This will help to ensure a human rights-based approach to surrogacy. 
Rights of the Surrogate 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to health 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s right 
to health: 
 How can New Zealand best respect, protect, and fulfil the surrogate’s rights to psychological 
and social support during the pregnancy and after the birth?  
 How can New Zealand promote clinical decision-making in relation to surrogate pregnancies 
that minimises physical and psychological risks to the surrogate? 
 How can New Zealand best respect, protect, and fulfil the surrogate’s right to exercise control 
over her body during the pregnancy and birth? 
 If s 14 of the HART Act were amended or repealed such that surrogacy contracts could be 
enforced, how would the surrogate’s rights to exercise control over her body during the 
pregnancy and birth be protected? 
 What could New Zealand do to facilitate rights-consistent processes and procedures in 
hospitals for surrogate births? 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to privacy 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s right 
to privacy: 
 What justifications can the New Zealand government offer for the limitation on the 
surrogate’s right to enter into an enforceable surrogacy contract? 
 What justifications can the New Zealand government offer for the limitation on the 
surrogate’s right to enter into a paid surrogacy arrangement? 
 Do these justifications meet the criteria for legitimate limitation on international human 
rights? 
 Do these justifications constitute unjustified discrimination against surrogates? 
 What are the fundamental values of the New Zealand community in relation to surrogacy? 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s employment rights 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the surrogate’s 
employment rights: 
 How can New Zealand employment law protect the needs of surrogates for postnatal 
recovery? 
 How can New Zealand employment law prevent discrimination against surrogates? 
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 If it were accepted that commercial surrogacy could take place in New Zealand, how should 
the work be valued?  
 If it were accepted that commercial surrogacy could take place in New Zealand, how would 
the issues around pay-equity that arise in other gender-segregated industries be avoided? 
Rights of the Child 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the best interests of the child 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the best interests of 
the child: 
 How should the best interests of the child be promoted in any surrogacy law reform? 
 Whether the guiding principles applying to decision makers under the HART Act (currently 
reflected in s 4) should explicitly include the best interests of the child? 
 Whether the Adoption Act 1955 and the Status of Children Act 1969 should include reference 
to the best interests of the child? 
 Whether Oranga Tamariki’s current screening procedures for intended parent(s) as adoptive 
applicants are adequate? 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to nationality 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the child’s right to 
nationality: 
 Should New Zealand create a unique visa category for children born of an international 
surrogacy arrangement with New Zealand resident intending parent(s) who seek to bring the 
child into New Zealand after birth overseas?  
 Should New Zealand amend the Citizenship Act 1977 to explicitly recognise children born of 
an international surrogacy arrangement with New Zealand commissioning parent(s) as 
automatically entitled to New Zealand citizenship? Should there be a genetic link to one or 
both of the commissioning parent(s)? 
 If a unique visa category and/or unique citizenship recognition is created for children born of 
an international surrogacy arrangement? What sort of requirements/checks are required to 
guard against sale or trafficking in children? 
 Should New Zealand ratify the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons to 
strengthen its protection for stateless persons (including children born stateless as a result of 
an international commercial surrogacy arrangement)? 
 Should New Zealand strengthen its legislative framework for protecting stateless persons 
(including children born stateless as a result of an international commercial surrogacy 
arrangement) by establishing a specific statelessness determination procedure? 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to identity 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the child’s right to 
identity: 
 Would it be useful for the HART Act to include more specific reference to relevant human 
rights such as the right to identity? 
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 Would it be useful for the ACART Guidelines to refer explicitly to the child’s right to identity 
(and indeed other rights)? 
 How can provision of information about a child’s genetic origins be ensured? Should intended 
parent(s) in New Zealand be required to disclose the circumstances of their child’s conception 
to them? How could this be enforced or monitored in practice? Should there be automatic 
release of information once the child turns 18? How would this be achieved in practice? 
 How does the requirement for intending parent(s) to adopt their child under the Adoption Act 
1955 operate to inhibit or mask the realisation of the child’s right to identity? 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right not to be sold 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the child’s right not to 
be sold: 
 Does New Zealand’s current practice of implicitly condoning international commercial 
surrogacy arrangements by making adoption orders in favour of New Zealand intending 
parent(s) breach art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC?  
 Should New Zealand prohibit international commercial surrogacy arrangements involving 
New Zealand citizens or permanent residents residing in New Zealand by giving s 14(3) of the 
HART Act extraterritorial effect, in order to better comply with art 35 and CRC-OPSC? 
 On the other hand, if New Zealand was to amend s 14 of the HART Act so as to permit 
commercial surrogacy arrangements in New Zealand, would this lead to a breach of art 35 CRC 
and CRC-OPSC? 
 Should New Zealand explicitly seek the views of the Committee on the Rights of the Child via 
its next periodic state report (due in May 2021) on whether and in what circumstances 
commercial surrogacy arrangements breach art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC?244 
Rights of the Intended Parent(s) 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to reproduce 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the intended parent(s)’ 
right to reproduce: 
 Is the ACART requirement of a genetic connection between at least one intended parent and 
the surrogate-born child justified?  
 Should surrogacy be limited to people experiencing medical or social infertility? 
 Is state funding of reproductive treatment discriminatory?  
 Should surrogacy contracts be enforceable? 
 Should there be provision for state-funding of the costs of surrogacy (beyond the assisted 
reproductive treatment)? 
Questions about New Zealand’s current approach to the right to science 
The following questions arise in relation to New Zealand’s current approach to the intended parent(s)’ 
right to science: 
                                                          
244 Note however that the Committee failed to engage with a US assertion that commercial surrogacy did not 
breach art 35 CRC-OPSC because it was not exploitative. For discussion see Baird, above n 66, at 128-129. 
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 Do any limitations on access to surrogacy (for example any prohibition on surrogacy, 
prohibition on commercial surrogacy, prohibition on international surrogacy) interfere with 
intended parent(s) right to science? 
 Is New Zealand obliged to proactively facilitate access to surrogacy (and other ARTs) in order 
to meet its obligations to fulfil the right to science? 
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